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COMMENTS
EMPLOYMENT DEFAMATION EXPANDS EMPLOYER
LIABILITY IN THE AT-WILL CONTEXT
[Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 389
N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Frankson v. Design Space
International, 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986)]
INTRODUCTION
More than two-thirds of the non-agricultural work force in the
United States is employed under the at-will employment doctrine.'
According to the at-will rule, an employee may be terminated at any
time for any reason,2 even for a reason morally wrong,s without the
1. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321 n.6, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 921 n.6 (1981) (noting that somewhat less than 28% of the non-agricultural
workforce is employed under terms of a union agreement); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge. The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv.
L. REV. 1816, 1816 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Protecting Employees] (citing U.S. Census
Bureau statistics which state that 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired
on an at-will basis, while 22% are unionized, and 15% are federal or state employ-
ees); see also Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979) (discussing the prevelance of at-will employment and
estimating that as many as 300,000 at-will employees could state colorable claims for
unjust discipline or discharge each year).
2. The at-will doctrine allows the discharge of employees without regard to eq-
uitable considerations, such as the length of faithful service, foregone opportunities,
or ability to secure future employment. See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964) (the court found no claims for wrongful
discharge even though the employee's ability to secure substitute employment was
limited by reason of his long service to the former employer), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
914 (1964); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (the employee was
discharged after 45 years of faithful service and satisfactory performance with but
one year remaining before his retirement).
3. An illustration of the power and prerogative vested in the employer by the at-
will doctrine is found in cases of sexual harrassment in the work place. See, e.g.,
Comerford v. Int'l Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1932). In Comerford, the
plaintiff was discharged because his wife refused to sleep with her husband's supervi-
sor. The court dismissed the husband's wrongful discharge suit on the grounds that
the at-will doctrine gave the employer the right to discharge employees for any rea-
son whatsoever.
A legal mechanism to prevent sexual harassment of employees was not in place
until the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even then, it wasn't
until the mid 1970's that the courts decided that this legislation was applicable to
sexual intimidation of employees by their supervisors and employers. See, e.g., Mun-
ford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (where a female
employee was dismissed for refusing to consent to sexual intercourse with her super-
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employer being subject to legal liability.4 However, the rule has
come under increased attack during the last decade.5 Courts in the
United States have developed numerous exceptions to the rule, im-
posing employer liability for wrongful discharge under both tort and
contract theories.6
In addition to liability for wrongful discharge, an employer may be
held liable for independent tort claims, 7 which often flow from the
very same set of facts. Examples of such claims include intentional
infliction of emotional distress8 and interference with employment
visor; the court decided that she had a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); see also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Electric Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3rd Cir.
1977) (the court overturned the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for wrongful discharge for refusal to participate in sex with the supervisor).
4. The at-will doctrine is often illustrated by a passage from an early Tennessee
case, which describes the doctrine as follows: "All may dismiss their employees at
will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 132 Tenn. 527,
540, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (1915).
5. For a discussion of the development of the at-will doctrine, see generally
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985);
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984);
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Sides v. Duke
Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985); Ludwick v. This Minute of Caro-
lina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.
2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); L. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 2.01 (1986); Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
6. See infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
7. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 887-88 (Minn. 1986); see also Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-41, 234 N.W.2d
775, 789-90 (Minn. 1975) appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 902 (1976). See generally Mallor,
Punitive Damages For Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
449, 479-84 (1985); Strausberg, A Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or Implied: Punitive
Damages In Torts Arising Out of Contract In Maryland, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 275 (1984);
Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal
Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 236-40 (1977); Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Ac-
tions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980) [hereinafter
Punitive Damages].
8. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). In Hubbard,
the employee argued that his employer, UPI, "discriminated against him on the basis
of an alleged disability, alcoholism." Id. at 431. The employer discharged him in
retaliation for his engaging in protected activity to protest that discrimination. Id. In
addition, Hubbard asserted that UPI intentionally and recklessly conducted a contin-
uous "campaign of harassment" against him when he disclosed that he was complet-
ing a program of treatment for alcoholism, and that UPI thereby intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on him. Id. The court, in Hubbard, recognized for the
first time in Minnesota the separate and independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, discarding the previous requirement of contemporaneous physi-
cal injury. Id. at 438; see also Note, Minnesota's "New Tort". Intentional Infliction of Emo-
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contract. 9 Since these claims lie in tort, punitive, as well as compen-
satory, damages are available.10 Recently, the defamation claim has
become the basis for expanded employer liability."l
Generally, an employer is not liable for defamation if he does not
publish false statements to a third party.' 2 Similarly, an employee
may not recover for damages resulting from his own publication.13
Recent decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court have modified
these settled principles, expanding employer liability for defamation
in the at-will context. Under current law, an employer may be liable
in defamation for stating reasons for discharge which are later
proven false.
In Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,14 four
former employees brought suit against their employer for breach of
an employment contract and for defamation based upon self-publica-
tional Distress, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 349, 349 (1984). The tort threshold is high,
however: the conduct actionable must be "extreme and outrageous" and the distress
must be severe. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438-39. The court concluded that Hubbard
had failed to prove his emotional distress claim. Id. at 440.
9. See, e.g., Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). The tort of interference with employment contract occurs when a third party
induces the employer to discharge an employee. The elements of intentional inter-
ference with a present contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged
wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional procurement of its breach;
(4) without justification; and (5) damages. Id. at 775. See also Furlev Sales and Associ-
ates, Inc. v. North American Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn.
1982); Snowden v. Sorenson, 246 Minn. 526, 532, 75 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1956). In
Potthoff, the discharged employee alleged that Jefferson Lines and its president inten-
tionally interfered with his contractual relations with his employer. Potthoff, 363
N.W.2d at 773. Jefferson had employed Potthoff as a bus driver. Id. He was termi-
nated after he was involved in an accident. Id. Contemporaneously, Jefferson en-
tered into a contract with another bus company, Four Star Bus Lines, to take over
some of the less profitable routes that Jefferson was required to operate under its
license from the ICC. Id. Potthoff was employed by Four Star after losing his job
with Jefferson. Id. Because of the contract between Jefferson and Four Star, Four
Star stored and serviced its buses at the Jefferson facility. Id. This made it necessary
for Four Star drivers to come onto Jefferson property to leave and pick up buses. Id.
at 774. When Jefferson's president learned that Potthoff was coming onto Jefferson
property and using Jefferson facilities, he informed Four Star that if they did not
terminate Potthoff, he would revoke the bus contract Jefferson had with them. See id.
Four Star immediately discharged Potthoff, who subsequently sued for tortious inter-
ference of employment contract. See id. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff, award-
ing damages for lost wages, emotional suffering, and punitive damages. Id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the award of lost income and punitive damages,
but reversed the award for emotional suffering. Id. at 778.
10. See infra note 31.
11. See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
12. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 113, at 797 (5th ed. 1984).
13. Id. at 802.
14. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
1987]
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tion. During application for employment following discharge, the
employees felt compelled to restate the false reason given by the em-
ployer for their termination. The employees consequently failed to
secure new employment. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court decision in favor of the employees on both the con-
tract and defamation claims,'5 thereby adopting an exception to the
general rule that a party may not recover for his own defamatory
publication.
In Frankson v. Design Space International,16 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that an employer may be liable for defamation even
where publication is made only to employees and agents within the
corporation itself. Under the facts of Frankson, preparation of a de-
famatory termination letter and distribution of that letter to two of-
ficers of the corporation and to plaintiff's personnel file constituted
publication of the defamatory statement.' 7 In both Frankson and
Lewis, the false reasons for dismissal became grounds for a defama-
tion claim.
These decisions have significant implications for future litigation.
Employment defamation strikes at the heart of the at-will doctrine,
which permits an employer to discharge a employee at any time and
for any reason not otherwise illegal. Minnesota's recent decisions on
defamation sharply qualify the at-will rule: termination may still be
made at any time and for any reason, but the reason for termination
must be "true," in fact and not only in belief. These decisions have
resulted in increased liability for employers. They have broad impli-
cations for future litigation, because the alleged wrongful basis of
any discharge will, at the same time, be grounds for employer liabil-
ity in defamation. Minnesota has rejected, until only recently, a tort
action for wrongful discharge.18 Now, however, an employee may
nevertheless receive a tort judgment in defamation if the basis for
the discharge is proven not to be true. After Lewis and Frankson, the
wrongful basis of any discharge may be grounds for a defamation
claim. 19
15. Id. at 877.
16. 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986) (affirming on publication, but reversing on
employer privilege).
17. Id at 144.
18. Minnesota has recently adopted a tort action for wrongful discharge based
upon a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine. See Phipps v.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review
granted. See also Wild, 302 Minn. at 442, 234 N.W.2d at 790. See also infra notes 53,
140-57 and accompanying text.
19. The dissents in both Lewis and Frankson recognize the implication of these
decisions upon future litigation. Justice Kelly disagrees with the majority in Lewis in
its view that liability will be narrowly "imposed only where the plaintiff was in some
significant way compelled to repeat the defamatory statement and such compulsion
[Vol. 13
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To understand the legal implications of these recent cases, one
must look at both the law of at-will employment as well as the law of
defamation. This Comment will focus upon the interrelationship
and apparent conflict between these two bodies of law. Part I de-
scribes the nature of the at-will employment rule and its judicially
developed exceptions, including Minnesota's own position with re-
spect to the tort of wrongful terminations. Part II describes the rele-
vant aspects of defamation law in the at-will termination context.
Part III is a description of the significant aspects of the Lewis and
Frankson decisions. Finally, Part IV will discuss the implications of
these developments in the broader context of at-will employment
law.
I. THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. Generally
According to early common law, an employment agreement with-
out a fixed term was terminable by either party at any time without
incurring liability.20 The at-will rule was applied almost universally
was, or should have been, foreseeable to the [employer]." Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 896
(Kelly, J., dissenting). Kelly charges that "[i]n claims brought by ex-employees
against employers for defamation when the employment was terminated for 'incom-
petence,' 'dishonesty,' 'insubordination,' or for any other reason carrying a connota-
tion of immorality, ineptness, or improbity, 'compulsion' will almost automatically be
found in connection with future job applications by the discharged employee. Such
'compulsion' would, with certainty, be foreseeable by the ex-employer." Id. Conse-
quently, the adoption of the re-publication doctrine "substantially expands the scope
of the defamation action." Id.
Similarly, the dissent in the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in Frankson,
charged that Frankson extends the holding in Lewis, itself an extension of the law.
Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 573 (WozniakJ., dissenting). While Lewis involved the self-
publication of a defamatory statement to potential employers, in Frankson there was
no publication outside the corporation. Id. Where the contents of a termination let-
ter are communicated only to company employees, the critical issue in a defamation
action is whether publication exists. Id.
20. English common law viewed employment as a contractual relationship which
continued a year at a time unless the parties indicated their intention otherwise.
Blackstone's statement of the English rule is as follows:
[I]f the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law con-
strues it to be a hiring for a year;... and no master can put away his servant,
or servant leave his master, after being so retained, either before or at the
end of this term, without a quarter's warning; unless upon reasonable cause
to be allowed by a justice of the peace, but they may part by consent, or
make a special bargain.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 425 (2d ed. 1872). The
yearly presumption could be rebutted, but only if a yearly contract was not the intent
of the parties. Under the English rule, the parties must have expressly agreed that
the employment was at-will, Adoption of the English rule in America was unsettled
19871
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by the courts until the early 1950's.21 Contemporary courts have
formulated numerous exceptions, based both on tort and contract
during much of the nineteenth century. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment
at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 122-23 (1976).
At the turn of the 20th century, courts in the United States took the position that
an employment contract with an indefinite duration was terminable at-will by either
party. This principle was first articulated by H.G. Wood in 1877. See H.G. WooD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). Wood stated the at-
will employment rule as follows: "[tihe rule [in America] is inflexible, that a general
or indefinite hiring is primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." Id. at 272.
Earlier commentators held to the English rule. See C. SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT, 53-57 (1852). Some courts continued to state the one
year (English) hiring rule despite Wood's pronouncement. See Feinman, supra, at
125-29.
While the English rule held that a contract which failed to specify its duration
was for one year, the new American rule held that a contract of employment was
terminable at any time and for any reason unless the parties expressly agreed other-
wise. If the parties intend an employment contract for a definite duration, they must
include an express term to that effect within the contract. Without such an express
term, the employment is terminable at any time and for any reason by either party.
21. Wood's concept of at-will employment became the standard followed by a
majority of American courts. Wood's rule was first applied in Martin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), where the court indicated that its
application of the at-will rule followed directly from Wood's earlier formulation of
the at-will doctrine. Scholars and jurists agree that Wood's treatise was responsible
for nationwide acceptance of the rule. They also agree, however, that the doctrine is
not supported by the authority on which Wood relied, nor that it depicts the law as it
then existed. See Feinman, supra note 20, at 126-27; Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); PROTECTING
EMPLOYEES, supra note 1, at 1825 n.51; Note, Implied Contract Rights toJob Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafterJoB SECURrrv]; see also Pugh, 116 Cal. App.3d at
320, n.3, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 921 n.3.
The at-will rule was firmly integrated into American common law by the United
States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175-76 (1908) and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1915). In Adair, the court declared unconsti-
tutional a federal statute which imposed criminal penalties for the discharge of em-
ployees for union membership. The Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional
because it was contrary to the fifth amendment guarantee of individual liberty, prop-
erty, and freedom of contract. In Coppage, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
Kansas statute forbidding "yellow dog" contracts which required employees, as a
condition of employment, to agree not to join a union.
The new American rule emerged during the late nineteenth century at a time
when political and judicial attitudes favored policies of laissez faire economics, free-
dom of contract, and free enterprise. The decisions in Adair and Coppage illustrate the
attitude of the period. The Supreme Court reasoned that by restricting the em-
ployer's liability and increasing his freedom to hire and fire employees, the at-will
doctrine would foster free enterprise and stimulate economic growth. For a descrip-
tion of the social and economic attitudes associated with the adoption of the at-will
doctrine, see generally Blades, supra note 5; Feinman, supra note 20. The at-will doc-
trine was almost universally followed by the courts in the United States until the
1950's.
[Vol. 13
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principles. 22 In some cases, legislatures have mandated reform.23 In
22. Judicial reevaluation of the at-will doctrine began in 1959 with Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959)
which established the public policy exception. "Public policy" is defined as "that
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good ...... Safeway Stores v.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953) (quoting
Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50-51, 264 P. 529, 530 (1928)). The
primary criticism of the public policy exception has been the difficulty associated with
defining "public policy." See infra note 38.
The employee in Petermann had been discharged because he refused to commit
perjury before a legislative committee. The court acknowledged that the at-will rule
applied, but held that the right to discharge was limited by public policy considera-
tions. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 186, 344 P.2d at 27. The Petermann court stated
the public policy rationale as follows:
The public policy of this state ... would be seriously impaired if it were to
be held that one could be discharged by reason of his refusal to commit
perjury. To hold that one's continued employment could be made contin-
gent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer
would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee
and employer and would serve to contaminate the honest administration of
public affairs. This is patently contrary to the public welfare.
Id. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27.
Subsequent cases in California based upon the public policy exception included
a number of cases involving employer violation of public policy expressed in CAL.
LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971), which gives workers the right to organize and select
representatives to bargain on their behalf. See Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d
69, 75, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1970); Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275
Cal. App. 2d 168, 174, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546-47 (1969); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden
Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 796, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 771-72 (1961).
Eventually, other states followed with exceptions of their own. In Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), the Indiana Supreme
Court held that an employee discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim had
a civil cause of action for wrongful discharge. Id. at 254, 297 N.E.2d at 428. A year
after Frampton was decided, the state of New Hampshire, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), adopted an exception to the at-will rule
based upon the concept of "good faith and fair dealing" as part of every employment
contract. In Monge, the plaintiff was discharged when she resisted the sexual ad-
vances of her supervisor. The court decided that the termination was made in bad
faith and violated public policy because it was not in the best interest of the economic
system or the public good. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
Litigation has increased since these first cases. By 1982, a majority of courts had
adopted a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on a variety of theories. See
Weiss, State by State: Chipping Away at Employment At-Will, NATIONAL L. J. 26 (Jan. 18,
1982).
23. In Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980), the Ala-
bama Supreme Court refused to find a judicial exception to the at-will rule where an
employee had been discharged as a result of serving on a grand jury. The position
taken by the Alabama Supreme Court was that state statutory protection for an em-
ployee from loss of compensation while serving on a grand jury does not extend to
protect him from discharge. Id. at 595. The Alabama Legislature promptly enacted a
statute to prevent discharge under such circumstances. ALA. CODE § 12-16-8.1
(1986).
Other states have passed similar legislation, sometimes under similar circum-
19871
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fact, Congress and state legislatures have been steadily chipping
away at the at-will rule since at least the 1930's.24
stances. For instance, the California Court of Appeals, construing the then current
California law, decided that an at-will employee may be fired for agreeing to serve on
a jury. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 395-96, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-75
(1960). The California Legislature subsequently enacted a provision to prevent such
reprisals. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West Supp. 1987). The statute prohibits discrimi-
nation against or discharge of any employee who takes time off from work to serve on
a jury or as a witness. Id. The law provides that any employer who violates the stat-
ute must reinstate and reimburse the employee for losses due to discrimination or
discharge and further provides that the employer's willful refusal to make such repa-
rations is punishable as a misdemeanor. Id.
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Dockery v. Lampart Table Co.,
36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978),
refused to give relief to an employee who had been discharged for filing a worker's
compensation claim. In denying relief for the employee, the court stated, "[i]f the
General Assembly of North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created,
surely, in a workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would have
specifically addressed the problem." Id. at 244 S.E.2d at 275. In response, the North
Carolina legislature promptly passed corrective legislation to prevent such abuse of
employer discretion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985). The statute provides a cause
of action for "retaliatory" discharge, in effect overruling Dockery.
24. The at-will doctrine has been eroded by federal labor legislation passed since
the 1930's, as well as by federal civil rights legislation of the 1960's, and subsequent
state legislation. For a list of the specific legislation see Protecting Employees, supra
note 1, at 1827 nn.63-67. During the 1930's, Congress recognized that individual
employees were powerless to demand a definite term contract. Congressional re-
sponse to this inequality in bargaining power was the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act. The Court noted that in its
statement of findings and policy concerning the National Labor Relations Act, Con-
gress declared that, because of the inequality of bargaining power, freedom of con-
tract was an illusory right, nonexistent in the employer-employee relationship. The
purpose of this legislation was to protect the employee's right to collective bargain-
ing. The act states that one of its purposes is to protect the right of employees "to
engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Most collective bargaining
contracts contain provisions which prohibit dismissal without "cause," or "just
cause," thereby abrogating the at-will doctrine. Approximately 80% of all nonagri-
cultural collective bargaining contracts contain a requirement that all dismissals be
for cause or just cause. See Peck, supra note 1, at 8. In 1981, only 25 percent of the
nonagricultural work force was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. See
Protecting Employees, supra note 1, at 1934.
The second wave of legislation which further diminished the at-will doctrine
came in the wake of the civil rights movement of the 1960's. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employer discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color,
religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a) (1982). Other civil
rights legislation also affects the at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (protecting handicapped); Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), (3) and (4) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
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Exceptions to the at-will doctrine can be divided into three general
categories: exceptions with a tort basis,25 exceptions based upon
contract principles,26 and exceptions which imply a concept of
"good faith and fair dealing." 27 Tort actions for wrongful termina-
tion are based upon the assumption that some public duty28 or pol-
icy29 has been violated by the termination. Tort remedies, such as
§ 660(C) (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1982); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2011
(1982).
State governments have passed legislation similar to that provided at the federal
level which affords additional protection for certain employee groups. For a tabula-
tion, see LARSON, supra note 5, at chapter 10. Minnesota, for example, has passed
legislation which protects employees. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 363.14 (1986) (makes employers civilly liable to employees for discrimination on
the basis of age, sex, race or marital status); MINN. STAT. § 182.669 (1986) (for dis-
charge of an employee who refuses to work under conditions which violate the Min-
nesota State Occupational Safety and Health Act). See also MINN. STAT. § 593.50,
subd. 3 (1986) (civil cause of action for an employee who has been discharged for
serving on a jury); MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (1986) (for filing workers compensation
claim); MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1986) (for refusing to take a lie detector test); MINN.
STAT. § 571.61, subd. 2 (1986) (for having his or her wages garnished).
25. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
28. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980). In Tameny, the court held that a wrongful discharge lawsuit exhibits
the classical elements of a tort case, as distinguished from contract. Most signifi-
cantly, the court found a duty outside the promises found in the contract itself. In
reaching this conclusion, the court wrote as follows:
[Ain employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who
refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express or im-
plied "promises set forth in the [employment] contract..." but rather re-
flects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the
fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal statutes.
Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (quoting Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal.2d
807, 811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952)).
29. Principles of public "duty" or "policy" are frequently defined by statutory or
constitutional reference. Few courts have permitted "public policy" to embrace prin-
ciples not expressed explicitly in public law. See Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981). See also Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982), where the court suggested a guide
as to how "public policy" in wrongful discharge cases should be determined:
In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is violated, courts
should inquire whether the employer's conduct contravenes the letter or
purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme.
Prior judicial decisions may also establish the relevant public policy. How-
ever, courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public pol-
icy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.
Id. at 631.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin wrote as follows: "[a] wrongful dis-
charge is actionable when the termination clearly contravenes the public welfare and
gravely violates paramount requirements of public interest. The public policy must
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punitive damages, are available in such cases.3 0
Tort liability has been found to exist in many situations. For ex-
ample, liability has been found where the employee is terminated for
filing a worker's compensation claim;31 for refusing to give false tes-
timony at a trial or administrative hearing;32 for serving on a jury;as
be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision." Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brad-
street, 113 Wis.2d 561, 573, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983).
30. The most significant distinction between tort and contract theories of wrong-
ful discharge has to do with the issue of damages. Punitive damages are generally
not available in contract actions. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480,
486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis.2d 285, 290-92, 155 N.W.2d
74, 77 (1967). This rule applies in the employment context as well. See Fincke v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. Pa. 1978). The rationale for
the rule rests upon the contract principle that a promisee should not be put in a
better position than he would have been in had the promisor performed. See FARNS-
WORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 12.8, at 842 (1982). Therefore, under the contract theory of
wrongful termination, the employee may recover only compensatory damages, such
as lost wages.
However, in the case of wrongful termination based upon tort theory, the em-
ployee may recover punitive as well as compensatory damages. See, e.g., Tameny, 27
Cal. 3d at 167, 610 P.2d at 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The purpose of punitive
damages is often related to some public policy objective which is accomplished by
punishing the defendant. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 266-67 (1981). It is also intended to deter defendant or others from engaging in
similar future conduct. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978);
Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See also Palmateer,
85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d at 876; sources cited supra note 7; supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973).
32. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 184, 344 P.2d at 25. In Petermann, the
plaintiff was fired because he refused to commit perjury before a legislative commit-
tee. The court stated:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee,
whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the
ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically
enjoined by statute.
Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
See also Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985). With this
case, North Carolina adopted for the first time the tort of wrongful discharge based
upon public policy. Id. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826. The employee in Sides was a nurse
anesthetist who was discharged in retaliation for testifying in a medical malpractice
action. Id. at 332-34, 328 S.E.2d at 820-22. The court stated its reasons for adopting
the "public policy" tort as follows:
[I]n a civilized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties abound the
words "at will" can never mean "without limit or qualification,".... Thus,
while there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or
for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such
a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy.
A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which
law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent. We hold,
therefore, that no employer in this State, notwithstanding that an employ-
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or for refusing to commit an unlawful or unethical act such as violat-
ing antitrust,3 4 consumer protection,35 or health safety laws.36
Because of the inherent difficulty with defining the public "duty"
ment is at will, has the right to discharge an employee and deprive him of his
livelihood without civil liability because he refuses to testify untruthfully or
incompletely in a court case.
Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
33. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1983). In Wishotoni, a bank manager was fired less than two weeks after being sub-
poenaed to appear before a grand jury, but over two months after his employer had
been informed by an FBI agent that the manager was being investigated for his in-
volvement in a numbers racket. The court cited a number of Michigan statutes in-
tended to protect the grand jury system. It held that the "system would be affected
adversely if an employer could discharge with impunity an employee for the reason
that the employee had been called to appear and testify before a grand jury" and
that such "legislative statements of public policy clearly imply the existence of a cause
of action for wrongful discharge" under these circumstances. Id. at 383.
But cf. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980). The
court, in Bender, noted the lack of an express legislative mandate that would justify a
wrongful discharge action where the employee was discharged for missing work
while serving on a grand jury. Id. at 595. The court reasoned that state law, Alabama
Code section 12-16-8 (1975), which protected an employee from loss of usual com-
pensation while serving on a grand jury, did not extend to protect him from dis-
charge itself. Id.
An exception based on public policy which encourages jury service, however,
does not require statutory support for its application. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). In Nees, the employee was discharged because she did not
seek to be excused from jury duty after her employer told her that a month's absence
from work for that reason would be too long. The court held that the employee was
entitled to recover compensatory damages. Id. at 220-21, 536 P.2d at 516. The court
stated that the employee's right to recover was recognized "because of the substan-
tial 'societal interests' in having citizens serve on juries." Id.
34. See, e.g., Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 167, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In
Tameny, the employee alleged that he was fired in retaliation for his refusal to partici-
pate with his supervisor in a scheme to fix the retail price of gasoline. The scheme
violated the Sherman Act, the Cartwright Act, and certain consent decrees which had
been entered into in a previous antitrust prosecution against Atlantic Richfield. Id. at
170-71, 610 P.2d at 1331-32, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41. The basis for the court's
decision in favor of the plaintiff employee is that the employer's duty to refrain from
discharging such an employee is imposed by a fundamental duty not itself derived
from or dependent upon the promises found in the contract. Id. at 176-77, 610 P.2d
at 1335-36, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45. See also supra note 29.
35. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978). In Harless, the plaintiff was the office manager of the defendant bank's con-
sumer credit department when he became aware of intentional customer overcharges
for prepayment on installment loans, which violated federal and state laws. Id. at
272. After Harless reported the violations to his supervisors, the bank files involved
were ordered destroyed. He was discharged after he rescued the files and delivered
them to the bank's auditors. Id. In holding for the employee on the basis of wrong-
ful discharge based on public policy, the court cited provisions of the state's Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act establishing a right of action for persons subjected
to practices prohibited by the Act. Id. at 275-76. The court stated that such an im-
plied cause of action would enhance the Act's enforcement:
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or "policy" 3 7 on which a tort action is based, many states have de-
We have no hesitation in stating that the Legislature intended to estab-
lish a clear and unequivocal public policy that consumers of credit covered
by the Act were to be given protection. Such manifest public policy should
not be frustrated by a holding that an employee of a lending institution cov-
ered by the Act, who seeks to ensure that compliance is being made with the
Act, can be discharged without being furnished a cause of action for such
discharge.
Id. at 276.
36. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984).
In Garibaldi, the plaintiff had been discharged after he reported to state health offi-
cials that he had been compelled to deliver adulterated milk. Id. at 1368. The Ninth
Circuit noted that the sale or delivery of "impure, polluted, tainted, unclean, un-
wholesome, stale or adulterated milk" is prohibited by California law and that the
employee's disclosures in order to protect the public health and safety was precisely
the type of conduct protected by Tameny, an earlier California decision. Id. at 1373-
74.
37. A definition of "public policy" is the single most significant element in a
court's decision whether to invoke the public policy exception. Developing a coher-
ent definition of public policy, however, has long been recognized as a source of
judicial difficulty and confusion. See, e.g., Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at
878, where the court stated that "the Achilles heel of the principle lies in the defini-
tion of public policy."
Similarly, Story wrote that "[p]ublic policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluc-
tuating, varying with the habits and fashions of the day ... that it is difficult to deter-
mine its limits with any degree of exactness." W. STORY, LAW OF CONTucrs § 546,
547 (3d ed. 1851).
Another court stated that "jurists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly
workable definition of public policy... [Jiudges are frequently called upon to discern
the dictates of sound social policy and human welfare based on nothing more than
their own personal experience and intellectual capacity." Maryland-Nat'l Capital
Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 605, 386 A.2d
1216, 1228 (1978) (reference omitted).
The fact that courts are reluctant to define public policy in the absence of a clear
legislative mandate is illustrated by the following two cases. In Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), the discharged employee was a
salesman for a company in the business of selling steel pipe for oil exploration. Id. at
173, 319 A.2d at 175. He was concerned that steel pipe intended for use under high
pressure was not adequately tested and constituted a hazard to the user. He re-
ported his concern to his superior but was told to "follow directions." He then took
his case to a vice-president. The pipe was eventually retested and withdrawn from
the market. The employee was discharged shortly thereafter. Geary argued that he
took his actions in the best interest of the public and to have done otherwise would
have violated public law. Id. The court rejected Geary's argument, not because pub-
lic policy was irrelevant, but because such actions were not Geary's job. Id. at 181,
319 A.2d at 179. The court held that Geary was not sufficiently qualified to uphold
public policy in this area. Id.
A further example of the reluctance of courts to recognize a wrongful discharge
action in the absence of a clear legislative mandate is illustrated by Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). In Pierce, the employee was a
medical doctor who was responsible for research on a new drug. The doctor's team
was faced with deciding whether to test an experimental drug on human subjects.
Initially, the entire team advised against testing for fear the drug may cause cancer.
The company pressured the team into changing its opinion. Dr. Pierce protested the
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clined to recognize an action for wrongful termination based upon
tort concepts. An alternative to tort-based actions for wrongful ter-
mination are exceptions based upon contract principles.
In contract-based cases, courts often seek merely to enforce the
intent of the parties by finding an implied-in-fact contract. In an at-
will employment agreement, the parties have failed to specify its du-
ration. The parties may introduce the missing terms unilaterally, the
terms may be implied as a matter of law, or by the action of the par-
ties themselves. For example, courts have held that an employer
may unilaterally modify an otherwise at-will agreement by communi-
cating, either orally or in an employment handbook,38 that the em-
ployee will not be terminated except for just cause3 9 or by specific
procedures .40
further development of the drug because she felt her participation violated her Hip-
pocratic oath. She was subsequently discharged. Id. at 62-64, 417 A.2d at 506-08. In
Pierce's wrongful discharge suit, the court held for the employer because clear issues
of public policy had not been demonstrated. Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514. The court
noted that Pierce had not alleged that the anticipated testing of the drug would vio-
late any state or federal regulation, nor that it would offend the principles of the
American Medical Association, nor that Pierce would herself be exposed to malprac-
tice liability for her role in researching the drug. Id. at 74, 417 A.2d at 513. In such a
case, the court noted, the plaintiff's basis for refusing to act was personal, not public,
and thus outside the scope of an implied cause of action for wrongful discharge
based upon public policy. Id. at 75-76, 417 A.2d at 514.
The principle which emerges from these cases is that the issue as to whether
public policy is clearly defined rests within the discretion of the court. Courts have
generally been reluctant to define the nature of public policy in the absence of clear
legislative guidance, however.
38. See generally Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment At-Will Contracts, 1985
DUKE L.J. 196, 206-12 (examines both the traditional and progressive views of the
contractual status of employee handbooks).
39. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980), the employee argued that his employment contract was based on
both written and oral promises. The employee was given a manual of Blue Cross
personnel policies which stated that, for those employees who had completed their
probationary period, it was the company's policy "to treat employees leaving Blue
Cross in a fair and consistent manner and to release employees for just cause only."
Id. at 617, 292 N.W.2d at 893. The manual also contained a list of specific proce-
dures to be followed before an employee could be fired. Id. The court, in Toussaint,
concluded that the employee had stated a cause of action based, in part, on the em-
ployee manual. Id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885. For a more detailed analysis of
Toussaint, see Casenote, Master & Servant-Employment Contracts - The burden of establish-
ing standards of performance as a basis for employment termination rests upon the employer:
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 59 U. DET. L. URB. L. 83 (1981).
40. Employee handbooks can state a contract for managerial personnel as well as
non-managerial employees. In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443
N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982), the employee signed an employment applica-
tion which stated that his employment would be subject to the provisions of the em-
ployee handbook. Id. at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194. When Weiner,
in his own managerial capacity, fired subordinate employees, he was warned by his
superiors that failure to discharge for just cause and in accordance with the proce-
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Some courts have found covenants implied at law, such as good
faith and fair dealing, which can modify an otherwise at-will employ-
ment agreement. Most states hold that there is a requirement of
good faith and fair dealing4" implied as a matter of law in all formal
written employment contracts where the duration of employment is
already expressly stated.42 Good faith and fair dealing is also re-
quired where there is a promise not to terminate as long as services
are performed "satisfactorily."43
Only a few jurisdictions, however, have adopted the good faith and
fair dealing44 requirement in the at-will employment context.45
dures outlined in the employee handbook could make the employer legally liable to
the discharged employee. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. It
was not surprising that, when Weiner was himself discharged in violation of company
procedures, the court ruled in his favor. Id. at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d
at 198.
In Weiner, the fact that company policy was expressly stated tended to work in the
employee's favor and to the employer's disadvantage. This is not always the case,
however. Written policy statements do not always work against the employer, but
can protect him as well. In Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D.
Mich. 1980), the employee signed an employment application stating that he under-
stood his employment could be terminated with or without cause at any time, regard-
less of what the employee might have been told by other managerial employees
subsequent to the commencement of employment. Id. at 346. When the employee
sued for wrongful termination, the court held that the statements found in the em-
ployment application and also in the employee manual could be used as evidence to
show that the intent of the parties was to keep the employment at-will. Id.; accord
Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (hold-
ing that an employment contract providing for termination of employment with or
without cause precludes a discharged employee from claiming he was entitled to dis-
charge only upon cause).
41. For the principle that an obligation of "good faith and fair dealing" is im-
plied by law in all contracts, see 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 568, at 331
(1960); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 526-28 (1982); 5 S. WILLISTON, WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1985); see generally Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV.
369, 404 (1980) (identifying jurisdictions recognizing a covenant of good faith per-
formance in every contract); Note, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Com-
mon Ground for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1111, 1142 (1981) [hereinafter Covenant of Good Faith] (arguing that covenant
should be imposed in employment relationships).
42. See, e.g., Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785, 787,
605 P.2d 963, 965 (1980) (stating that when a contract has a definite term, the em-
ployee can only be terminated prior to expiration of contract when employee
breached a contractual provision or for other "good cause" reason).
43. See, e.g., Crest Coal Co. v. Bailey, 602 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ky. 1980) (applying
subjective test allowing employer to discharge employee based on work record where
employer acts in good faith).
44. The principle of good faith and fair dealing to be applied in the at-will con-
text was stated by the California Supreme Court as follows: "there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do
anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agree-
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Others have taken the position that employers and employees may
ment." Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958) (emphasis in the original), quoted in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980). See also Fortune v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). In Fortune, the plaintiff
alleged that he was terminated because the employer sought to avoid paying him
commissions on a five million dollar sale. Id. at 96-97, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. The
plaintiff was employed under a written contract, which specified that he could be
terminated at will. Id. The court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, stating the
principle that, in every contract, there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing not to deprive the other party the benefit of the contract. Id. at 104, 364
N.E.2d at 1257.
A party breaches the obligation of good faith if he exercises discretion conferred
upon him by the contract for reasons not within the parties' reasonable contempla-
tion at the time of contract formation. See Burton, supra note 41, at 385-86. Reasons
for breach within the parties' reasonable contemplation in the at-will context are
likely to be restricted to economic and performance criteria. If the employer's moti-
vation for dismissal is performance related, the dismissal does not breach the duty of
good faith. See Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 285, 290
(1984). It is often non-performance motives, however, such as spite or ill-will, that
terminated employees challenge. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
In Monge, a female machine operator had been demoted and eventually dis-
charged after refusing her supervisor's sexual advances. Id. at 130, 316 A.2d at 550.
The court, in ruling for the employee, imposed a duty of good faith when it stated
that a "termination by the employer... motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. Since
the dismissal derived from the sexual harassment, it was not performance related,
involved ill-will and spite and therefore contravened the notion of good faith. Dis-
missal with malicious intent to injure the employee invariably constitutes a breach of
the obligation of good faith. See Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d
1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1977); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419,439-42, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90
(1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); see also Blades, supra note 5, at 1407-09;
Note, supra, at 289-90.
45. At least fourjurisdictions have adopted a requirement that an employer exer-
cise the power to discharge only in good faith. See Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc.,
193 Conn. 558, 568-72, 479 A.2d 781, 788-89 (1984) (court announced good faith
requirement in employment contracts and discharges but, in doing so, was not ready
to go so far as imply discharge only for good cause); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d
1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983) (holding that good faith would preclude termination to
prevent sharing in profits); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-
05, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977) (finding employer acted in bad faith by terminat-
ing employee to avoid paying commission); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196
Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982)(holding distribution of handbooks cre-
ates an employee expectation of fair dealing). California has implicitly adopted the
rule, see Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917. New Hampshire, where the
rule was first announced, has retreated and now requires that the discharge violate
public policy. See Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
Wisconsin and Hawaii have expressly refused to follow the rule requiring discharges
be only in good faith. See Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 377, 652 P.2d at 629; Brockmeyer, 113
Wis.2d at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838 (declining to adopt a good faith requirement, but
recognizing a public policy exception).
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agree between themselves as to the good faith and fair dealing
requirement.46
B. Minnesota
Minnesota continues to hold to the common law doctrine of at-will
employment,47 but has followed the modern trend in recognizing ex-
46. To settle the issue as to whether the parties intended to adopt a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, courts often look to the actions of the parties themselves.
See, e.g., Fischer v. Pinske, 309 Minn. 202, 243 N.W.2d 733 (1976); accord House v.
Baxter, 371 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Factors considered to be important
may vary, but taken together they might imply a promise by the employer not to
terminate the employee without cause. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 927. In Pugh, a long-time vice-president of the company was terminated after
thirty-two years of service. Id. The court found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action based on the "totality of the parties relationship." The court held that an
implied covenant of good faith could exist based on the facts of the case, including
factors such as duration of employment, the recommendations and promotions re-
ceived, the lack of direct criticism, the assurances given by the employer and the
companies acknowledged policies. Id.; Accord Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455-56, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 729.
47. Minnesota law in regard to at-will employment was described by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W.
872 (1936) and Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d
213 (1962). In Skagerberg, the plaintiff had taken a permanent position with Blandin
Paper Company as the company's power supervisor and mechanical engineer at a
plant in Grand Rapids, Minnesota when he was subsequently terminated. Skagerberg,
197 Minn. at 293, 266 N.W. at 873. When the plaintiff accepted the position, he was
self-employed as a consulting engineer and also had ajob offer from Purdue Univer-
sity to be a part of their faculty. Id. at 292-93, 266 N.W. at 872-73. The plaintiff
performed satisfactorily for almost two years with Blandin Paper before he was termi-
nated. Id. at 292-94, 266 N.W. at 873. The Minnesota Supreme Court held on appeal
that no contract existed. The court stated that, in the absence of additional consider-
ation over and above the services rendered, an employee hired for permanent em-
ployment could be terminated at will. Id. at 296-98, 266 N.W. at 874. The court
clarified that giving up other employment in order to accept a new position does not
constitute additional valuable consideration leading to an exception to the at-will
doctrine. Id. at 301, 266 N.W. at 877.
In Cederstrand, the plaintiff had been employed as the company personnel direc-
tor. Part of her job involved maintaining a manual of personnel policies. One of
those company policies stated that no employee would be discharged without cause
and that, ordinarily, the employee would be given disciplinary warnings and a chance
to improve performance before termination would be made. Cedarstrand, 253 Minn.
at 523, 117 N.W.2d at 215-16. The policy manual was not, however, generally distrib-
uted to employees. The plaintiff was discharged and subsequently sued for wrongful
discharge, arguing that the discharge was made without cause and without the proce-
dures specified by the employee manual. Id. at 526-27, 117 N.W.2d at 218. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court, nevertheless, held that since the plantiff was employed under
an at-will agreement she could be discharged at any time. In holding for the defend-
ant employer, the court stated the at-will employment rule as follows:
The usual employer-employee relationship is terminable at the will of
either; the employer can summarily dismiss the employee, the employee is
under no obligation to remain at the job. A hiring for an indefinite term is
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ceptions to the at-will doctrine.48 Until recently, these exceptions
have been based primarily upon traditional contract principles,49 in-
cluding an implied-in-fact contract exception derived from personnel
manuals. 50 Applying contract law, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had decided that definite language in an employee handbook can
create contractual obligations which are enforceable against the
employer.5t
terminable at will. Unless plaintiff can establish that she was to be dismissed
only for cause by proving a contract to that effect, her employment can be
terminated at any time and without cause.
Id. at 532, 117 N.W.2d at 221 (citations omitted).
48. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 882-83.
49. Exceptions to the at-will rule in Minnesota include cases which follow the
principles of "independent consideration" and "promissory estoppel." In Bussard v.
College of St. Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972), the plaintiff
conveyed his interest in the Catholic Digest Magazine to St. Thomas College. The de-
fendant had paid $175,000, but half of the stock was conveyed as a gift. The plaintiff
argued that the agreement included the condition that he remain the publisher of the
magazine. Id. at 219-20, 200 N.W.2d at 159. Five years after the transfer of owner-
ship of the magazine, the plaintiff was "involuntarily" retired and subsequently sued.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the transfer of the magazine con-
stituted independent consideration which could support the argument of an oral con-
tract. Id. at 228, 200 N.W.2d at 163. The plaintiff may have, in effect, purchased a
lifetime position by giving valuable consideration over and above that found in the
services rendered by the employee. Id.
In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981), the
Minesota Supreme Court adopted an exception based upon promissory estoppel.
The plaintiff, in Grouse, had accepted a position as a pharmacist with the defendant.
After the plaintiff was told that he had been hired, he resigned his present job and
turned down another. Id. at 115-16. Before he actually started working with Group
Health, the job offer was revoked. The court held that a contract could be implied as
a matter of law in this case based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at
116. In dicta, the court suggested that the same principle might apply in other at-will
circumstances as well. Id. See also Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351
N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 1, 1984). In Eklund,
the court held that employees terminated even after four years of employment might
utilize the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 378.
50. See generally Note, supra note 38. The Note discusses Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) as a case which applies unilateral contract
analysis in developing a "handbook" exception to the employment at-will doctrine.
51. In Pine River, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that provisions in an em-
ployee handbook which meet the requirements of a unilateral contract may become
enforceable as part of the employment contract. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626-27.
To create a unilateral contract, a promise of employment on particular terms of un-
specified duration must be presented in the form of an offer and must be accepted by
the employee. Id. at 626. The offer must be definite in form and must be communi-
cated to the employee. Id. Continued employment by the employee constitutes ac-
ceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract, providing the necessary consideration
for the offer. Id. at 627. The plaintiff, in Pine River, was employed as a loan officer in
a small rural bank. The bank distributed an employee manual which specifically ad-
dressed such issues as "job security" and "disciplinary policy," which included pro-
gressive disciplinary procedures. Id. at 624-26. Although the court found that the
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Minnesota has declined to adopt an exception based upon the con-
cept of good faith and fair dealing.52 The state has recognized only
recently a tort action for wrongful discharge based upon public pol-
icy.53 Minnesota had previously declined to recognize a tort action
plaintiff was an at-will employee, it concluded that the language in the employee
handbook had transformed the at-will agreement into an enforceable contract. Id. at
630. In addressing the issue of consideration for the new contract derived from the
employee handbook, the court decided that the employee had provided sufficient
consideration merely by remaining on the job after receiving the handbook. Id. at
629. Once the handbook had been communicated to the employee, the employer
was obliged to follow the procedures outlined in it. When the employer failed to
follow those procedures, he was in breach of the employment contract. Id. at 631.
See also Case Note, At- Will Employment-Contractual Limitation of an Employer's Right to
Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N. W2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L.
REV. 463 (1984).
52. See Wild, 302 Minn. at 440-41, 234 N.W.2d at 790. The plaintiff, in Wild,
argued that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was contained in his
employment contract and that bad faith or malicious breach provided for a tort rem-
edy. Wild stands for the proposition that Minnesota does not imply a covenant of
good faith in employment contracts as a matter of law. The court recently reiterated
its reluctance to adopt the good faith exception. See Hunt v. IBM Mid America Em-
ployees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986); see also Mason v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Minn. 1979).
Both the Minnesota Supreme Court and court of appeals have considered the
issue of good faith. See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 622 (it should be noted that the
court's main focus involved creation of an employment contract from an employee
handbook); Eklund, 351 N.W.2d at 378. On both occasions, the courts responded
positively toward good faith as a concept to which the parties could agree within the
contract itself. This agreement may be expressly stated or implied from the actions
of the parties. However, given the Minnesota court's previous positions on at-will
employment, it seems unlikely that the courts will adopt the position that there is an
implied at law covenant of good faith in employment contracts. Such a position
would take the court out of contract theory and into tort. See generally Protecting
Employees, supra note 1 (suggesting the application of either modem contract or tort
concepts); Covenant of Good Faith, supra note 41 (proposing balancing the employer
- employee interests in discharges to situations legitimately related to the conduct of
business); Note, supra note 44 (advocating notice of dismissal and participatory re-
view procedures to protect an employee against bad faith and/or arbitrary
dismissals).
53. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986). In Phipps, the plaintiff had been employed by Clark Oil Refining Corporation
as a cashier at a self-service gas station. A customer asked Phipps to pump leaded
gasoline into an automobile equipped to operate only on unleaded fuel. Phipps'
manager told him to comply with the request, but Phipps refused, believing that
pumping leaded gasoline into the tank of an automobile designed to use only un-
leaded fuel was a violation of the law. Phipps was willing to pump unleaded gasoline
into the car, but his employer fired him nevertheless. Id. at 589.
Phipps brought an action against the employer for wrongful discharge and defa-
mation. The trial court granted Clark Oil's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
stating that Minnesota law allowed Phipps' termination for any reason or for no rea-
son at all. Phipps appealed. Id. at 589-90.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing for the first time in Min-
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for wrongful discharge, but left the door open for actions under spe-
cial circumstances where the defendant had committed an independ-
ent tort. 54 Tort remedies, including punitive damages, are available
in such a case. 55 Employment defamation is one of the independent
torts for which an employer may be liable.
II. EMPLOYMENT DEFAMATION
The elements of common law defamation are well settled in the
United States.56 For a statement to be defamatory, it must be com-
municated to someone other than the plaintiff, it must be false, it
must not be invited,57 and it must tend to harm the reputation58 of
nesota a tort action for wrongful discharge based upon a public policy exception.
The court noted that a majority ofjurisdictions recognize a public policy exception to
the employment at-will doctrine. Id. at 592-95. Courts have reached the public pol-
icy exception as a means to balance the competing interests of society, the employee,
and the employer. One significant societal interest is the maintenance of lawful con-
duct. Society has an interest in opposing an employer conditioning employment on a
requirement that the employee participate in unlawful conduct. An employer's au-
thority does not include the right to demand that an employee commit a criminal act.
Id. at 590-92. Therefore, the court held, an employer is liable if an employee is dis-
charged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 592.
54. In Wild, 302 Minn. at 423-24, 234 N.W.2d at 781, the plaintiff argued that his
employment contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and that a bad faith or malicious breach of that covenant provided for a tort remedy.
The court noted that when a plaintiff seeks to recover for an alleged breach of con-
tract, the plaintiff is limited to damages flowing from breach alone, except in excep-
tional circumstances, where the defendant's breach of contract constitutes or is
accompanied by an independent tort. The Wild court held that the breach of an em-
ployment contract was not one of those exceptional cases where a breach amounted
to an independent tort. Id. at 442, 234 N.W.2d at 790.
55. Tort remedies are available in five types of cases: (1) breach of a fiduciary
duty; (2) fraud; (3) breach of a public service contract; (4) breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing; and (5) where breach is accompanied by an independent tort.
See Mallor, supra note 7; see also Punitive Damages, supra note 7.
56. For discussion of employment defamation, see generally Duffy, Defamation
and Employer Privilege, 9 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L. J. 444 (1983-84); Grosman, Wrongful
Dismissal: Damages for Loss of Reputation or Stature, 4 ADVOCATES Q. 317 (1983); Cas-
tagnera-Cain, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Actions in Typical Employee Relations Situ-
ations, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 1 (1982); Castagnera-Cain, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy,
and Use of Lie Detectors in Employee Relations-An Overview, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 189
(1982); Note, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 143 (1977); Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 155 (1978); Annot., Libel and Slander: Privileged Nature of Communication To Other
Employees or Employees' Union of Reasons for Plaintiff's Discharge, 60 A.L.R.3d 1080
(1974); Annot., Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee's
Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R.4th 144 (1983).
57. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 114, at 823; see, e.g., Litman v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1984) (the court reversed
defamation claim in favor of defendant where plaintiff knew prior to authorizing pro-
spective employer to contact defendant that defamatory statement might be made).
But see Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
19871
19
Borth: Employment Defamation Expands Employer Liability in the At-will C
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff and lower him in the esteem of the community.59 Accu-
sations of crimes,60 or offenses involving moral turpitude, 6 1 and def-
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985), where an insurance executive hired a private inves-
tigator to determine the true reasons for his discharge. The investigator posed as a
prospective employer and recorded conversations with employees of the defendant,
the former employer. The court held that the plaintiff had not invited the defamatory
statement because, while plaintiff could expect that the former employer would give
his opinion, plaintiff did not know that Hall's employees would defame him when the
investigator made his inquiries. Id. at 617. The defendant also argued that he was
tricked into making the defamatory statements. The court replied that a defendant
could not escape liability by showing that, although he desired to defame the plain-
tiff, he did not desire to defame him to the person to whom he, in fact, intentionally
published the defamatory statements. A publication is complete even though the
publisher is mistaken as to the identity of the person to whom the publication is
made. Id. at 618 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 COMMENT E (1977)).
See also Rainey v. Shaffer, 8 Ohio App. 3d 262, 456 N.E.2d 1328 (1983). In
Rainey, the plaintiff had been turned down for a position after what she regarded as a
successful interview. Plaintiff then requested her present employer to do a reference
check with a former employer she had listed as a reference to determine the fairness
of the former employer's reference. Id. at 262-63, 456 N.E.2d 1330. The court con-
sidered the question as to whether the defamatory remarks used by the defendant
were excused because they were made as a result of plaintiff's requested investiga-
tion. The court held that if an investigation is conducted without the intent to bring
suit or to trick the defendant into making a slanderous statement, the plaintiff is not
estopped from maintaining an action. An honest inquiry by the person defamed as to
the existence, source, content or meaning of a defamatory publication is not a de-
fense to an action for defamation. Id. at 263-64, 456 N.E.2d at 1331.
58. See, e.g., Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). In Agriss, the court held that the issue as to whether a state-
ment can be defamatory depends upon the audience and the scope of publication.
The plaintiff, in Agriss, received a warning letter from his employer accusing him of
"opening company mail." The warning letter was widely circulated among plaintiff's
fellow employees. Agriss sued for defamation. The trial court entered a nonsuit, and
Agriss appealed. Id. at 460. On appeal, the defendant argued that the words "open-
ing company mail" were incapable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, however, ruled that the words "opening company
mail," as applied to Agriss and circulated among his fellow employees, were factual
allegations charging Agriss with a concrete act of impropriety capable of impugning
appellant's good name or reputation and, as such, were capable of defamatory mean-
ing. Id. at 462-63.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-59 (1977). See also Stuempges v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980); W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON,
supra note 12, § 111, at 771.
60. See Gibby v. Murphy, 325 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), where the em-
ployer, by and through his agent, falsely accused the plaintiff of being charged with
crimes of embezzlement. In Gibby, the plaintiff worked for Orkin Exterminating
Company (Orkin) as a salesman of exterminating contracts. While on a sales call,
Gibby sold a customer an exterminating contract and also a contract to have her
house insulated by Gibby's step-father. The customer gave Gibby a single check for
both contracts. Gibby cashed the check and paid the appropriate sum to Orkin and
the remainder to his stepfather for the insulation work. The customer later com-
plained to Orkin that she had been overcharged for the extermination contract.
Orkin wrote Gibby a letter which accused him of misappropriation of company funds
[Vol. 13
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss3/6
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
as well as fraudulent tactics with a customer. The letter was delivered to Gibby and a
copy was also delivered to the customer's accountant, who forwarded it to her attor-
ney. After his termination, Gibby was unable to find other employment. When a
prospective employer contacted Orkin, Orkin's office manager stated that Gibby was
no longer employed by Orkin, that there was a warrant outstanding for him for em-
bezzlement and fraudulent misuse of money and that Orkin would not recommend
Gibby for employment. Id. at 674-75. At trial, the jury found that Orkin had abused
its qualified privilege by falsely accusing Gibby of being charged with a crime. Id. at
675. On appeal, the court affirmed. Id. at 676.
See also Kelly v. General Telephone Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 186 Cal. Rptr.
184 (1982). In Kelly, the employee had voluntarily terminated his employment, and
upon subsequently applying for reemployment, discovered that he was ineligible be-
cause of alleged slanderous statements made by his former supervisor. Kelly, 136
Cal. App. 3d at 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The California Court of Appeals held:
(1) That there was publication despite the fact that the alleged libelous statements
were made by one of defendant's employees only to other employees of defendant.
Id. at 284-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 186. (2) That the alleged statement that plaintiff
falsified invoices clearly implied that plaintiff did so with intent to defraud, and was
therefore slanderous per se, thereby charging plaintiff with forgery. Id. at 285, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 186. (3) There is a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the matter
before communicating the suspicion that a particular employee has falsified records if
the communication is motivated by malice. Id. at 286, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 187. (4)
"[T]he spreading of deliberately false statements that a former employee in effect
committed forgery is extreme and outrageous conduct" justifying a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 287, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
61. See, e.g., Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa
1984). In Vinson, the court held that a statement that the employee was fired for
making incorrect entries on her time card could reasonably be taken as imputing
dishonesty to the employee and was defamatory per se. Id. at 116. Plaintiff was em-
ployed as a school bus driver by defendant. Id. at 111. Plaintiff was paid according to
a designated route time for the route she drove each day. The designated route time
was not the actual time it took to drive the route but the amount of time determined
by the plaintiff's supervisor as a reasonable time within which the route should be
completed. The school disrict payroll system required employees to make entries on
time cards even though pay was based on a designated route time rather than actual
driving time. In filling out her time-cards, plaintiff recorded her return time as the
actual time shown on the office clock when she returned to the bus barn. In late
October of 1980, plaintiff's supervisor told her to fill out her time cards to show her
return time as the designated route time, regardless of the actual driving time. Plain-
tiff did not comply. Instead, she recorded her actual completion time rather than the
designated return time. Id. at 112. She continued this practice until December 1,
1980, when plaintiff's supervisor again requested that she change her time card to
show the designated return time. She refused. Plaintiff's supervisor then issued her
a written memorandum on the subject of "Falsifying Time Cards." When plaintiff
persisted in recording her actual rather than designated check-out time on her time
cards, she was suspended with another memorandum entitled "Suspension for falsi-
fying time cards." Id. at 113. When plaintiff returned to work after her suspension,
she continued to record her actual check-out time, claiming that to record the desig-
nated time would in fact be a falsification of her time card. The school district dis-
charged the plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently applied for a school bus driving job with
another school district. When the prospective employer inquired of the defendant
why Vinson had been discharged, her former supervisor replied that she had been
terminated "for recording the incorrect time on time cards." Id. at 114. At trial,
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amation affecting the plaintiff in his business,62 trade or profession
constitute defamation per se and are actionable without proof of ac-
tual damage.63 Truth is a complete defense, however, and true state-
ments no matter how disparaging are not actionable.64
An employer has a qualified privilege to describe the discharge of
an employee, 65 if the description is done in good faith66 and for a
plaintiff was awarded $59,500 compensatory and $31,000 punitive damages on her
defamation claim. Id. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that a statement
that an employee was fired for making incorrect entries on her time card could rea-
sonably be taken as imputing dishonesty to the employee. Id. at 116. The court sub-
sequently affirmed the lower court decision on the defamation claim, including
punitive damages. Id. at 118, 121.
62. See, e.g., Litman, 739 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1984) (applying Florida law). The
court, in Litman, affirmed a jury award of $150,000 and remanded for redetermina-
tion of punitive damages for slander resulting from statements made by defendant to
Litman's own employees, indicating that the reason for plaintiff's termination was
that plaintiff was a "bad" or "lousy businessman." Id. at 1555. The court held that
the record reflected that there was much disagreement as to whether Litman was in
fact a "bad businessman." The court decided that the jury could have properly
found that Litman was not a "bad businessman," as alleged by defendant's employ-
ees, or that he was terminated for that reason. Id. at 1561. The court determined
that the statements were slander per se and that Litman's reputation was extensively
damaged because of wide dissemination of the defamatory statements. Id. See also
Geyer v. Steinbronn, 351 Pa. Super. 536, 506 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The
employee in Geyer applied for employment as a security assistant with Sears, Roebuck
& Co., listing Miley Security Services on his application as his former employer.
When Sears contacted Miley Security regarding Geyer's work record, Miley's report
included information that Geyer was unable to cope with the duties assigned, that he
had a drinking problem, and that he was being investigated for forgery of checks
from the employees' credit union. Geyer, 506 A.2d at 906. This information was
given to Sears by a company vice-president who knew these facts were false at the
time. Id. at 908. Sears subsequently refused to hire Geyer. Id. at 907. Geyer sued for
defamation and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.
Geyer's wife entered claims for loss of consortium. The jury awarded verdicts in
favor of Geyer for $100,000 in compensatory damages for Geyer, $35,000 damages
for Mrs. Geyer's loss of consortium, and $50,000 in punitive damages against the
vice-president. Id. at 904. On appeal the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
Id. at 905.
63. See Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 255 (citing Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d
366, 372 (Minn. 1977)); see also W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 112, at
790-92.
64. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 116, at 839.
65. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890. Lewis is not the only "insubordination" case
where the reason for termination later became the basis for a defamation claim. See,
e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979). In
Agarwal, the employee was terminated for "insubordination," "lack of cooperation
and lack of job knowledge." Id. at 943, 603 P.2d at 65, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
Agarwal sought employment unsuccessfully for 13 months. Two potential employers
indicated that the defendant had given the plaintiff bad recommendations. Agarwal
subsequently filed suit for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and interfer-
ence with business relationships. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Agarwal for
$16,400 in general damages and $46,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 944, 603 P.2d at
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legitimate purpose.67 An employer may lose his qualified privilege68
65, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 148. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed. Id. at 938, 603
P.2d at 62, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
The jury found that the reasons for termination, including "insubordination"
were untrue, and maliciously motivated for the purpose of terminating the plaintiff.
Id. at 945, 603 P.2d at 66, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 149. The jury also found that there was
no dissatisfaction with, or criticisms of the plaintiff's job knowledge and cooperation
until maliciously motivated false reasons for discharge became grounds for various
independent torts, including defamation. Id.
66. See, e.g., Buck, 678 S.W.2d at 612. In Buck, the court noted that malice is
sometimes equated with "a want of good faith." Id. at 620. The court noted that
malice could be proved by circumstantial evidence. While evidence of ill will alone is
not enough to establish malice, proof that the defendant entertained ill will toward
the plaintiff is probative evidence. When coupled with other evidence, proof of ill
will may furnish sufficient basis for a jury's finding of malice. Id. The plaintiff, in
Buck, had been an executive vice-president for the insurance firm of Alexander &
Alexander and ranked nationally in the top five as salesman for Alexander before he
began work for defendant. Defendant agreed to pay Buck an annual salary of
$80,000, plus incentive commission up to a maximum of $600,000, plus fringe bene-
fits. Id. at 616. Before the year was up, plaintiff had been discharged. Plaintiff at-
tempted to find reemployment in the insurance industry, but was not successful. Id.
at 617. In an attempt to discover the true reason for his discharge, Buck hired an
investigator, who tape recorded defamatory statements made by defendant's presi-
dent and other management employees. The remarks included that Buck was un-
trustworthy, untruthful, disruptive, paranoid, hostile, and guilty of padding his
expense account; that Buck was horrible in a business sense, irrational, and ruthless;
that he was a "classical sociopath"; that he had stolen files and records from his for-
mer employer, Alexander & Alexander; and that he could have been charged for
theft. Id. The court found that the statements were made with actual malice, noting
that one of the individuals who made the defamatory statements, although Buck's
supervisor, drew less than half the salary than Buck was paid. Also, the defendant
saved about $75,000 in commission and salary by terminating Buck early. Id. at 621.
Plaintiff was awarded damages of $605,000 in actual damages and punitive damages
of $1,300,000. Id. at 630. See also Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58,
160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979). InAgarwal, the court upheld a jury finding that the plain-
tiffs termination for lack ofjob knowledge and insubordination was maliciously moti-
vated, justifying the loss of employer privilege. The jury finding was supported by
circumstantial evidence that there had been no dissatisfaction with, or criticism of
Agarwal's job knowledge and cooperation until the last two days of his employment.
As such, the court held that there was sufficient evidence which could lead the jury to
believe that statements of lack of job knowledge and lack of cooperation were
malicioulsy motivated for the purpose of terminating Agarwal. Id. at 945, 603 P.2d at
66, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
67. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 115, at 827; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 593 (1977); the law in Minnesota is:
[A] communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion,
from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable probable cause.
When so made in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the com-
munication itself, as in the ordinary case of libel. Actual malice must be
proved, before there can be a recovery, and in the absence of such proof the
plaintiff cannot recover.
Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 256-57.
68. See, e.g. Harrison v. Arrow Metal Products Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 174
N.W.2d 875 (1969). The court, in Harrison, put the traditional malice test aside and
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if he abuses it.69 Examples of such abuse are acting with malice 70
used a balancing test instead. On the one side, the court put the interests of the
employee and, on the other, the interests of the employer and society. The court
wrote:
Weighing the relative consequences to the employer and the employee,
of granting or denying privilege, aids in deciding which would further the
interest of society. . . . Contemplate the effect of an accusation, as here
made, upon the future life of the employee. Any prospective employer gen-
erally requires an applicant to furnish the names of all prior employers. In
one way or another the prospective employer usually contacts prior employ-
ers. This one unproved accusation could then become the basis for perma-
nently depriving a man of his dignity, good name, self-respect and right to
earn for the support of himself and his family. Whether the employer pub-
lishes with malice or without it, the effect on the employee is the same.
On the other hand the publishing employer suffers no consequences
whatever either by making or by not making the unproved accusation. The
prospective employer may suffer consequences if such an accusatory state-
ment is not made, but only if it is true. The publishing employer's interest
and duty, imperfect or otherwise, but required by reason and the interest of
society, are either to refrain from making the statement or if it is made, then
to be prepared either to prove it or to reimburse the employee upon failure
of such proof.
Id. at 614-15, 174 N.W.2d at 887.
69. See, e.g., Boiling v. Baker, 671 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert denied,
106 S.Ct. 79 (1985). In Boiling, the court affirmed ajury award of $125,000 to a nurse
in a slander action against her physician employer, finding that the nurse showed that
statements concerning her discharge, though subject to a qualified privilege, were
made with actual malice. Id. at 564-66. Prior to plaintiff's discharge, defendant ac-
cused her of changing the order of lab slips on a patient's chart in an alleged attempt
to cover up a mistake made by plaintiff when she sent a patient to the lab for a test
which had already been performed. Defendant demanded that plaintiff discover the
guilty party or be terminated. Id. at 563. Following plaintiff's termination, defend-
ant called a staff meeting. Referring to plaintiff, defendant informed the employees
that he could not work with someone who was a liar and who was not trustworthy and
loyal to his practice. Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that defendant had falsely ac-
cused her of being dishonest. At trial, the jury found that the statements made by
defendant were false and made with actual malice. The jury awarded $65,000 in ac-
tual and $60,000 in exemplar damages. Id. at 564.
On appeal, defendant asserted that the statements were qualifiedly privileged.
The court noted, however, that a privilege is lost when actual malice is shown. Id.
Evidence was presented that plaintiff had resisted defendant's romantic advances and
that defendant had attempted to retaliate. On one occasion, after plaintiff turned
down an invitation by defendant to go out with him, defendant performed a "proce-
dure," described as either an abortion or spontaneous miscarriage, at his clinic late in
the evening and left the room in a particularly offensive state for plaintiff to find and
clean the following morning. Id. at 565. Also, defendant's own testimony suggested
that he did not himself believe that the defamatory statements were true. The court
concluded that defendant's own acts were not consistent with a belief that plaintiff
was the guilty party, and lack of belief in the truth of the conditionally privileged
communication is an important factor in determining malice in a defamation case. Id.
Finding sufficient evidence to support the jury conclusion, the court affirmed. Id. at
565-66.
70. See, e.g., Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257. The standard applicable to an em-
ployer-defendant is lower than that of a media defendant. The defendant in Stuempges
argued that it should be held to an actual malice standard similar to a media stan-
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when making the publication or publishing in an improper manner7'
to an improper party.72
To be actionable, the defamation must be made to someone other
dard, where the defendant has actual knowledge that the defamatory statement is
false, or acts with reckless disregard to its falsity. The court, in Stuempges, rejected the
defendant's argument, holding that the correct standard in an employment case
would focus on the defendant's attitudes toward the plaintiff, rather than on the truth
of what he said. The court noted that, in the employer-employee situation, it is im-
portant to protect the job seeker from malicious undercutting by a former employer.
In such a context, the state of mind of the utterer of the alleged defamation is more
significant than whether he knew that what he was saying was false. Id. at 258. See
also W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 115, at 832-35.
71. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Avon Products, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Del. 1985).
In Gonzalez, terminated employees brought a libel action against their former em-
ployer on the basis of a speech given by the employer's general manager charging the
terminated employees with theft. The case was before the court on a summary judg-
ment motion. Following discharge of plaintiffs, the employer called a special meet-
ing of all plant employees, consisting of approximately 900-1000 people, and read to
them a statement which referred to the plaintiffs as having been terminated for cause
and continued in general terms about a violation of trust, the importance of contrib-
uting to and not taking away from the company, and the need for random searches as
a "reminder to stop and think before doing something that will have lifelong implica-
tions." Id. at 1557. The court denied the summaryjudgment motion on the grounds
that there was a material issue of fact to be resolved, including an issue of abuse of
employer privilege. Id. at 1560.
See also Worley v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 69 Or. App. 241, 686 P.2d 404
(1984). In Worley, the plaintiff brought a libel action against her former employer for
statements to fellow employees which accused plaintiff of theft. Plaintiff's termina-
tion resulted from her unauthorized possession of a key to her place of employment.
Following plaintiff's termination, her supervisor called a meeting of all department
personnel. At the meeting, he stated that an unidentified employee had been termi-
nated for possession of an unauthorized key. The supervisor went on to state that
several items of personal property had been missing before that date and that if any
other employees had unauthorized keys, they should turn them in. Plaintiff was the
only employee who had been discharged that day. Plaintiff sued, charging that the
combined statements made at the personnel meeting falsely accused her of theft.
The jury agreed, returning a general verdict in plaintiff's favor. On appeal, the court
affirmed, noting that there was evidence which could support the jury's conclusion of
abuse of employer privilege. Id. at 244-45, 686 P.2d at 406-07.
72. See, e.g., Agss, 334 Pa. Super. at 295, 483 A.2d at 456. Agriss was employed
as a truck driver by Roadway Express Inc. (Roadway). He received a "warning letter"
from Roadway stating that he had violated company policy by opening company mail.
A copy of the warning letter and protest by Agriss were forwarded to the union busi-
ness agent. Agriss then went on vacation. When he returned, a number of drivers
asked him about the warning letter and he also heard reference to the letter over the
C.B. radio. Over the next year, Agriss received numerous questions about the letter
from fellow truck drivers and from union officials. Agriss sued Roadway for defama-
tion. Roadway claimed that the statements were qualifiedly privileged, since the let-
ter was published to individuals entitled to receive it under the collective bargaining
agreement. The court noted, however, that the privilege could be lost if the pub-
lisher exceeds the scope of his privilege by publishing to unauthorized parties. In
Agriss, the warning letter was widely disseminated to people who were not authorized
to see it. Since there were only a few possible sources of the publication, it was
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than the person defamed.7S It may be made to any third person,
even when made to the defendant's own agent or employee, 74 where
the defendant is a corporation. 75 For example, dictation of the de-
famatory matter to a stenographer is sufficient publication.76
reasonable for the jury to conclude that Roadway was responsible for the letter's
wide publication. Id. at 459-64.
See also, e.g., Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, 62 Or. App. 698, 662 P.2d 760 (1983). In
Benassi, the employee brought a defamation action against his employer for its state-
ment to other employees that the former employee had been terminated because he
had been "drunk and misbehaving." The court found that the defendant abused its
privilege by exceeding the scope of the defamatory publication. The court noted that
the privilege to publish depends on the position of the employees to whom the infor-
mation is given. It may be necessary to make a full disclosure to supervisory person-
nel, while a simple statement to assembly line workers is sufficient to protect the
legitimate interests of the employer. In Benassi, the employer addressed approxi-
mately 120 employees for an explanation of plaintiff's discharge. Some of the em-
ployees were two levels in rank below plaintiff. The court held that the privilege had
been abused. Id. at 702-04, 662 P.2d at 762-64.
73. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 113, at 797.
74. See, e.g., Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
In Ramos, the plaintiff brought an action against his former employer for wrongful
termination and slander, where the plaintiff was informed by the general manager in
the presence of plaintiff's foreman that the reason for the termination was theft. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. Id. at 331. On ap-
peal, the court noted that the defendant had asserted in its motion for summary judg-
ment that there was no publication of the defamatory statement to a third party
because the foreman was an employee of defendant. Id. at 335. The court held that
the alleged defamatory statement was published, reasoning that, while the foreman's
status as an employee of the defendant may have relevance to the question of privi-
lege, it has no bearing on the issue of publication. Id.
75. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 113, at 798. The authors
note that there is some authority to the contrary, but apparently as the result of con-
fusing publication with privilege. Id.
See also Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 236 Kan. 710, 695 P.2d 1279 (1985). In
Luttrell, the employee sued for defamation where the employee's supervisor, acting
within the scope of his employment, communicated with other management person-
nel that the plaintiff had tape recorded telephone conversations, contrary to company
policy. Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 620, 620, 683 P.2d 1292,
1293 (1984). At trial, the plaintiff provided evidence which proved the statements
false and also, that they were made with malice, removing employer privilege. Id.
The defendant corporation alleged that interoffice communication is not publication
sufficient for defamation. Id. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the lower court
decision stating that communication between supervisory employees of a corpora-
tion, acting within the scope and course of their employment, regarding the work of
another employee of the corporation constituted publication to a third person suffi-
cient to support a defamation claim against the corporation. Luttrell, 236 Kan. at 711,
695 P.2d at 1280. The court noted Prosser's reference to cases which confuse publi-
cation with privilege. Id.
76. See W. KEETON AND W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 113, at 798-99; The RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment h (1977) states in part:
The dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer who takes shorthand
notes is itself a publication of a libel by the person dictating the letter even
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Ordinarily, the defendant is not liable for publication made by the
plaintiff.77 But where there is a strong compulsion on the part of the
injured party to republish the defamatory remarks and the com-
pelled republication is reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, the
defendant is liable.78 Under certain circumstances, even an em-
though the notes are never transcribed nor read by the stenographer or any
other person.
Id.
77. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 113, at 802.
78. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1980). In McKinney, the plaintiff sued his former employer for defamation based
on his employment discharge. The plaintiff argued that, having given false reasons
for his dismissal to the plaintiff, it must have been foreseeable to the employer that
the plaintiff would be under a strong compulsion to republish the statement to pro-
spective employers when they inquired. Id. at 797-98, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95. The
employee argued that the employer should be liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of his acts. The court agreed with the plaintiff, giving him thejudgment. Id.
at 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
See also Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). In Grist,
the plaintiff brought an action for wrongful discharge and slander. Like the plaintiffs
in Lewis, the employee in Grist alleged that Upjohn had given her false and defama-
tory reasons for her discharge, which she was thereafter forced to repeat to prospec-
tive employers when they asked about her former employment. Id. at 485, 168
N.W.2d at 406. The trial court instructed the jury that they could find slanderous
statements even if the statements were made only to the plaintiff by Upjohn. In af-
firming the trial court, the Michigan Appellate Court wrote:
Where the conditions are such that the utterer of the defamatory matter
intends or has reason to suppose that in the ordinary course of events the
matter will come to the knowledge of some third person, a publication may
be effected.
Id.
See also Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946).
In Colonial Stores, an employee was discharged for alleged misconduct toward fellow
employees. Id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307-08. The employer wrote the reason for the
discharge on the employee's certificate of availability. The certificate card was re-
quired at the time by the War Manpower Commission. Employees could not inter-
view with prospective employers without first presenting the card. Consequently, it
was probable that the employer was aware that any statement placed upon the certifi-
cate card would necessarily be republished by the plaintiff when he presented it to
prospective employers. In stating the principle of republication, the court wrote:
The rule, that there is no publication when words are communicated
only to the person defamed, is subject to exception or qualification....
There may be publication where the sender intends or has reason to sup-
pose that the communication will reach third persons, which happens, or
which result naturally flows from the sending.
Id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307.
See also Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Neighbors, the employee was employed as a clinic manager
when she was terminated. Id. at 823. At her request, the employer issued a service
letter to serve as a reference, pursuant to state law. The letter stated that Neighbors
was terminated because she had breached the confidentiality of a patient at the clinic.
The employer-defendant published the letter only to the plaintiff, who republished it
to prospective employers, with predictable consequences. Neighbors sued her em-
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ployer's silence is actionable if it can be expected that such silence
could result in damage to the plaintiff.79
III. THE LEwis DECISION
A. Facts
In the spring of 1980, the plaintiffs were employed by Equitable
Life Assurance Society as dental claims approvers in its St. Paul of-
fice.80 Each employee received a personnel handbook when they
were hired. The handbook contained statements about job security,
disciplinary procedures and severance pay. 8' When each employee
was hired, she was assured that her job was secure as long as her
production stayed at a satisfactory level.82
In the fall of 1980, the plaintiffs were sent to Equitable's Pitts-
burgh office on a temporary basis to work.83 The plaintiffs were
briefed on expenses but were not told that they would be required to
submit written expense reports.8 4
Upon their return to St. Paul, the four employees were com-
ployer for wrongful termination, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation for stating a false reason
for her termination. The court dismissed the first three counts on the basis that,
since Neighbors was an at-will employee, she could be terminated at any time for any
reason, or for no reason. Id. at 825. The court was determined that Missouri law on
the employee at-will doctrine may be subverted by cloaking a claim for wrongful ter-
mination under the guise of the prima facie tort doctrine. Id. at 824.
The court held, however, that Neighbor's cause of action for defamation was
valid. The publication of the service letter by the plaintiff falls within the exception
to the general rule that a plaintiff may not recover for his/her own publication. The
court stated "where the utterer of the defamatory matter intends, or has reason to
suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter will come to the knowledge
of some third person [he is liable]." Id. at 824 (quoting Herberholt v. dePaul Com-
munity Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617, 625 (Mo. 1981)).
79. See State ex rel. Kilburn v. Guard, 5 Ohio St. 3d 21, 448 N.E.2d 1153 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983). In Kilburn, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
public employee who served at the will of a public employer may be entitled to a full
name clearing hearing following discharge. The key issue in the case is whether the
employer's deliberate silence concerning termination constituted a violation of the
employee's liberty interests, triggering a due process name clearing hearing. See also
Case Note, Termination of Public Employment At Will Without Statement of Reasons-Silence
by Public Employer May Constitute Damage To Reputation, Thereby Requiring a "Name Clear-
ing Hearing": State ex rel. Kilburn v. Guard, 5 Ohio 3d 21, 448 N.E.2d 1153 (1983), 13
CAP. U.L. REV. 317 (1983).
80. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 880 (Minn. 1986).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 880-81.
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mended for their superior performance in Pittsburgh.85 Each em-
ployee was asked at this time to reconstruct her expenses and submit
a report. After doing so, Equitable indicated to them that the re-
ports submitted were unacceptable. Equitable requested changes in
regard to certain tips for maid services. Each employee complied,
but Equitable refused to accept the changed reports. Equitable then
asked that lower totals be entered and indicated the appropriate
amounts. The employees refused to comply, claiming that the lower
totals did not reflect their actual expenses.8 6
In January of 1981, the employees received a letter from Equitable
demanding that the reports be altered to reflect even lower amounts
than earlier specified. The employees again refused to comply and
were put on probation.8 7 A week later, Equitable decided to termi-
nate the four employees for "gross insubordination."
Before two of the employees were told that they were to be fired,
they were asked to repay advances for expenses over the actual
amount spent on the Pittsburgh trip. Each employee complied, after
which each was asked again to alter her report. When they refused,
they were terminated for "gross insubordination."88 "Because they
were fired for 'gross insubordination,' the plaintiffs received no sev-
erance pay. Had they been fired for other reasons, they would have
been entitled to as much as one month's severance pay." 8 9
When seeking new employment, each of the plaintiffs was re-
quested by prospective employers to disclose the reasons for leaving
their employment with Equitable. During the interviews, each plain-
tiff disclosed that they had been terminated for "gross
insubordination. "9o
Equitable neither published nor stated to any prospective em-
ployer that the plaintiffs had been terminated for gross insubordina-
85. Id. at 881.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court found that the "probations" given to the plaintiffs prior to
their dismissal were for the benefit of company management, providing them with
time to decide whether to terminate the employees. Id. at 884.
88. Id. at 881. The plaintiffs were terminated in accord with Equitable's human
resources manual, which gave examples of conduct it considered serious violations of
acceptable behavior. The examples included gross insubordination and falsification
of records, the very issue in dispute between the parties. The relevant section of the
manual provides as follows:
Gross misconduct is a serious violation of accepted standards of behavior.
Examples are: assaulting another employee, involvement in drug traffic,
theft or destruction of Equitable's or another employee's property, or mis-
using an I.D. card. Gross misconduct also includes gross insubordination
and falsification of any Equitable records including employment papers.
Id. at 881-82 n.3.
89. Id. at 882.
90. Id.
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tion. It is Equitable's policy to give only the dates of employment
and the final job title of former employees unless specifically author-
ized in writing to release additional information. 91
Only one of the plaintiffs found employment while being com-
pletely truthful with a prospective employer about her termination
by Equitable. A second plaintiff gained employment after she mis-
represented on her application her reason for leaving Equitable. A
third obtained employment only after leaving the question blank as
to her reasons for leaving her last employment. The fourth plaintiff
was unable to find full-time employment. 92 The employees subse-
quently commenced an action against Equitable for breach of con-
tract, wrongful termination, and defamation.
93
B. Holding and Analysis
A Ramsey County jury found that Equitable breached employment
contracts and defamed the plaintiffs. The jury awarded the plaintiffs
both compensatory and punitive damages. 94 The Minnesota Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court on all issues except damages for
future harm.95 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed on both the
breach of contract 96 and defamation claims,97 but reversed on the
award of punitive damages for defamation.98
On the defamation claim, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that Equitable defamed the plaintiffs when it stated false grounds for
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 880.
94. Lewis, 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The trial court award to the
four plaintiffs was as follows:
Contract Defamation Punitive Sub. Total
Lewis $22,100 $75,000 $150,000 $247,100
Smith 43,000 75,000 150,000 268,000
Rafferty 49,500 75,000 150,000 274,500
Loizeaux 10,500 75,000 150,000 235,500
TOTAL $125,100 $300,000 $600,000 $1,025,100
Id. at 879.
95. Id. at 884.
96. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 884. On the breach of employment contract claim, fol-
lowing the standard laid down in Pine River, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Equitable's employee handbook was sufficiently definite to create a binding employ-
ment contract. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 883. The handbook stated that salaried employ-
ees would be dismissed only for "serious misconduct," and then only after a warning
and a probationary period wherein the employee could bring performance up to a
satisfactory level. Id. at 883. Equitable breached the employment contract when it
discharged the employees without following the procedures required by the Equita-
ble employment manual. Id. at 884.
97. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 880, 891.
98. Id. at 880, 892.
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the termination of the employees.99 Generally, there is no publica-
tion where the defendant communicates a statement directly to a
plaintiff, who then recommunicates it to a third person.OO An ex-
ception exists where the plaintiff is compelled to repeat the defama-
tory statement to a third person, and it is foreseeable by the
defendant that the plaintiff would be so compelled.' 0 '
In Lewis, the court found that the employees were compelled to
repeat to prospective employers the false reasons given for their dis-
missal.102 Furthermore, Equitable knew that the employees would
be so compelled.OS The only alternatives open to the employees
when asked by prospective employers to identify the reasons for
their discharge was either to repeat the reasons given by their former
employer or to lie.' 04 Reasoning that deliberate fabrication is an un-
acceptable alternative in terms of public policy, the court found that
the employees were compelled to republish the defamatory reasons
for their dismissal.lO5 Accordingly, the court held Equitable liable
on the defamation claim, even though the employees had published
the defamatory statements themselves.106 The court thereby
adopted, in Lewis, the doctrine of self-publication in the context of
employment defamation.107
99. Id. at 889.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 577 comment m (1977).
101. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886-87. See also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
102. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Other issues in Lewis included the defense of truth, privilege and punitive
damages. Equitable argued that the issue of truth presented a question as to whether
the plaintiffs had been fired for gross insubordination. The court decided that the
issue of truth must center upon the truth or falsity of the underlying implications of
the statement-that the plaintiffs had in fact engaged in gross insubordination. Lewis,
389 N.W.2d at 889 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment e
(1977)).
On the issue of privilege, the court recognized that there might be concern by
employers that self-publication could result in liability every time an employer stated
a reason for dismissal. Unless a privilege is recognized, employers might decline to
inform employees of reasons for dismissal. Id. at 890.
In addition, the court noted that, where the employer would be entitled to a
privilege if it had actually published the statement, it makes little sense to deny the
privilege where the identical statements are communicated to the same third parties
but only the mode of publication is different. Id. Therefore, the court held that an
employer has a qualified privilege even in the case of defamatory republication. Id.
Finally, the court held that punitive damages will not be available in the case of
compelled republication. Id. at 891-92. The availability of punitive damages might
encourage publication of defamatory statements, where the plaintiff, rather than the
defendant, does the actual publication. In addition, the imposition of punitive dam-
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IV. THE FRANKSON DECISION
A. Facts
Frankson was employed by Design Space International (DSI) from
November, 1974 until November, 1980. DSI sells and leases mobile
offices and other modular structures. Frankson's employment was
governed by a series of contracts, with new contacts signed only
when he received pay increases or duty changes. Frankson was mov-
ing into the job of Major Projects Manager from Branch Sales Man-
ager when he signed his last contract in February, 1980.108
In addition to his salary, Frankson's employment contract pro-
vided for the payment of commissions on sales, which were governed
by a separate agreement entitled "Compensation Plan." The agree-
ment contained a clause which set a $5,000 limit on commissions
payable from sales to a single customer during a single year. 109
Frankson signed the 1979-80 Compensation Plan but inserted a
waiver stipulation on the $5,000 commissions limit. Frankson re-
quested that DSI's president, Ray Wooldridge, acknowledge the
waiver, but Wooldridge failed to act on the request. 1 10
Frankson testified that he added the stipulation regarding the limit
on commissions in anticipation of his advancement into the position
of Major Projects Manager. Frankson also testified that his supervi-
sor, William Lindelow, DSI's vice president, assured him that there
would be no commission limitation for salesmen in Major
Projects. 11
Between February 1, 1980 and July 31, 1980, Frankson had sales
of more than $2 million to a single customer, Montana Power.
These sales were made during a period when there was no written
compensation plan specifically applicable to Major Projects. Prior to
August 1, 1980, DSI had made individual agreements with the sales-
people involved in the Major Projects program.'
1 2
When the dispute over commissions arose, Lindelow, Frankson's
supervisor, advised him to prepare a memorandum indicating the
sales to Montana Power and the commissions payable on these sales.
When Lindelow received the memorandum, he approved payment
and forwarded the memo to Ray Wooldridge, DSI's president.
Wooldridge refused to approve payment of the commissions, which
totaled $28,196.27. A DSI compensation committee later offered to
ages on employers might deter employer communication of the reason for discharge.
Id. at 892.
108. Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 141 (Minn. 1986).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 142.
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pay Frankson $10,000 on the commissions, but Frankson did not
cash the check which DSI tendered to him.113
On November 17, 1980, Frankson was presented with a letter of
termination, giving the reason for discharge as "failure to increase
business as a Major Projects Representative."'14 The letter was pre-
pared by DSI's personnel manager, Edward Burns. It was distrib-
uted to Lindelow and Wooldridge. A copy of the letter was placed in
Frankson's personnel file.' 15
At trial, Frankson presented evidence of superior sales achieve-
ments as Major Project Manager up to September, 1980. Lindelow
testified, however, that Frankson had no sales in the quarter prior to
his termination.' 16
Frankson subsequently brought suit for defamation, breach of em-
ployment contract, wrongful termination, and compensation in
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services." 1
7
B. Holding and Analysis
The jury found that Frankson was employed at-will, and that DSI
had not breached employment agreements in determining Frank-
son's compensation or in terminating his employment.' 18 The jury
also found that statements in Frankson's termination letter were un-
true, and that they were made with actual malice.119 The jury
awarded Frankson $70,000 in compensatory damages and $125,000
in punitive damages on the defamation claim.120
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on all is-
sues, 12 1 including quantum meruit,122 publication,123 malice,124 and
punitive damages.' 2 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed on
the issue of publication,126 but reversed on the issue of employer
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 142, 144.
116. Id. at 142; see also Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 380 N.W.2d 560, 565
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
117. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 140-41.
118. Id. at 142. The jury found that Frankson was entitled to $28,196.27 for the
reasonable value of his service. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 563.
122. Id. at 569.
123. Id. at 566-67.
124. Id. at 567.
125. Id. at 568-69.
126. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 144. The supreme court also affirmed the jury
award of $28,196.27 on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services by
Frankson to DSI. Id. at 145.
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privilege. 127
The primary issue in Frankson involves publication, the first ele-
ment which must be proven in any defamation action.128 On appeal,
DSI argued that Frankson had not shown that the statement con-
tained in the termination letter was published. DSI argued that "in-
house" communication, limited to the corporate personnel director
and the president of the corporation, is not communication to a third
party sufficient for the purpose of publication.129
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an in-
house communication of a defamatory statement is publication.130
The court noted that other jurisdictions are divided on this issue.131
127. Id. at 144-45.
128. In order for a statement to be defamatory (1) it must have been communi-
cated (published) to someone other than the plaintiff, (2) it must be false, and (3) it
must tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation and to lower him in the estimation of the
community. Steumpges, 297 N.W.2d at 255. If the plaintiff was affected in his busi-
ness, trade, profession, office, or calling by the defendant's statement, it constitutes
defamation per se satisfying the third element of the action without proof of actual
damages. Id.
129. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 142-43.
130. Id. at 144. See also Hebner v. Great N. Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 289, 80 N.W. 1128
(1899). In Hebner, the plaintiff-employee went to his employer after his discharge to
get a copy of his service record. While at the employer's office, the book containing
these records was brought into the office and a clerk read the reason for the em-
ployee's discharge in the presence of another clerk, the employee-plaintiff, and the
employer-defendant. Id. at 290-92, 80 N.W. at 1128-29. The trial court, in Hebner,
held that the communication was sufficient publication. Id. The case suggests that
communication between two corporate employees, both with a need to know, is suffi-
cient publication to support a defamation action. Id.
See also McKenzie v. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 149 Minn. 311, 183 N.W.
516 (1921). In McKenzie, a defamatory statement was found by implication to be pub-
lished when the only listeners were the plaintiff-employee and his ex-employer's
manager. However, the primary issue in McKenzie was "privilege," not publication.
Id. at 312-13, 183 N.W. at 516-17.
131. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 143; see, e.g., Luttrell, 236 Kan. at 711, 695 P.2d at
1279 (the court decided that inter-office communication between supervisory per-
sonnel was publication "to a third person sufficient for a defamation action"); see also
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 542, 23 N.W.2d 247, 256 (1946)
(dictation to a stenographer of a letter was held sufficient publication to be libelous
even though the notes for the letter "are never transcribed nor read by the stenogra-
pher or any other person").
But see Ellis v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 581 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (no publication when the contents of personnel files are communicated only to
supervisory personnel within the corporation); see also Prins v. Holland-N. Am. Mort-
gage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 208, 181 P. 680, 680-81 (1919) (where the court decided
that communication between agents of the same corporation in the course of regular
business could not be publication of libel on the part of the corporation). The courts
in these cases appear to treat communication between agents of a corporation as
merely the corporation speaking to itself, holding that there is no communication to
third persons in such cases.
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Some confuse publication with privilege.132 Both the Restatement
(Second) of Torts155 and leading commentators, however, support
the position that intra-corporate communication is publication.t54
The court held that, under the facts of Frankson, preparation of the
defamatory letter and distribution of that letter to a personnel file
and to two officers of the corporation, Lindelow and Wooldrige, con-
stituted publication of the defamatory statement.1 5
Finding publication, the court went on to define a broad qualified
privilege for the employer.' 3 6 The jury found that statements con-
tained in Frankson's termination letter were not true and were made
with actual malice.' 3 7 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
132. See, e.g., Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis.2d 452, 462, 141 N.W.2d 251, 256 (1966)
(where the court noted that the issue of publication turned on whether the communi-
cation was privileged); see also Hoff v. Pure Oil Co., 147 Minn. 195, 199, 179 N.W.
891, 892 (1920) (where the court reasoned that since the communication was privi-
leged it was not a publication for the purpose of a defamation action); W. PROSSER
AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 113, at 798 n.15 (where the authors remark that
publication is often confused with the issue of privilege).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which states:
The dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer who takes shorthand
notes is itself a publication of a libel by the person dictating the letter even
though the notes are never transcribed nor read by the stenographer or any
other person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment h (1977).
134. Prosser, for example, states:
There may be publication to any third person. It may be made to ... the
defendant's own agent, employee or officer, even where the defendant is a
corporation. The dictation of defamatory matter to a stenographer gener-
ally is regarded as sufficient publication, although it may be privileged.
W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 113, at 798-99 (citing inter alia, Rickbeil
v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946)).
In Rickbeil, the only publication was dictation to a stenographer. In stating the
publication rule, the court wrote:
Publication of the defamatory matter is the communication of the same to a
third person. . . . The action may be maintained even if published to one
person only.... To publish is to intentionally exhibit the defamatory words
to one other than the libelee. No words more definitely convey the idea
requisite in law to support an action for writing defamatory words.
Id. at 533, 23 N.W.2d at 251.
135. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 144.
136. According to Minnesota law, an employer has a qualified privilege to de-
scribe the discharge of an employee, if the description is done in good faith and for a
legitimate pupose. See supra notes 65-67. An employer may lose his qualified privi-
lege if he abuses it, such as acting with malice when making the publication. See supra
notes 68-70. The malice standard in Minnesota is defined as "actual ill will, or a
design causelessly and wantonly to injure plaintiff." See McBride v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 306 Minn. 93, 98, 235 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1975). Whether the employer's quali-
fied privilege has been lost through abuse is ajury question. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at
890. The court, in Lewis, also noted that the initial determination of whether a com-
munication is privileged is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 619 (1977)).
137. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 144. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded
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concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's ver-
dict on malice.13 8 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled, however,
that neither the language used ("failure to increase sales"), nor the
mode and extent of publication (communication only to those in-
volved in the corporate decision making process, and deposit of a
copy in Frankson's personnel file), allowed for the conclusion that
Frankson's termination was the result of ill will and malice on the
part of Frankson's employer.139 To prove malice,140 the supreme
court stated, a plaintiff must present specific evidencel4t beyond the
mere assertion that there is another possible reason for the dis-
charge.142 The court concluded that Frankson had not met his bur-
that the jury found evidence of a greater degree of malice than needed for Frankson's
defamation claim. Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 567. The trial judge's instructions to the
jury described malice in several ways, including knowledge of falsity and reckless dis-
regard of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement. Id. This instruction over-
stated the applicable standard, since knowledge of falsity and reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity is applicable only in the case of media defendants. Id. (citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). That overstatement sug-
gests that the jury found evidence of a greater degree of malice than needed for
Frankson's claim. See Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 567.
138. Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 567.
139. 394 N.W.2d at 144.
140. The court noted that malice may be proven by "intrinsic evidence such as the
exaggerated language of the libel, the character of the language used, the mode and
extent of publication, and other matters in excess of privilege." Frankson, 394
N.W.2d at 144 (quoting Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203
N.W. 974, 976 (1925)).
141. The court noted that there was direct evidence that Frankson's termination
was motivated by his poor sales record. Lindelow, Frankson's immediate supervisor,
testified that Frankson made no sales in his final quarter with DSI, August through
October, 1980. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 145. Lindelow and Burns testified that the
commission dispute was not discussed at the meeting at which they decided to termi-
nate Frankson. Id. Contra supra note 138.
142. 394 N.W.2d 144. The standard requiring "specific" evidence to prove mal-
ice will be difficult for a future plaintiff to meet. Ordinarily, malice may be proved by
inference from circumstantial evidence. See supra note 66. The court of appeals, for
example, suggests that the fact that DSI would fire one of its top sales employees
because he demanded performance on an oral agreement on commissions suggests
malice on the part of the employer. See Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 568. The court of
appeals also notes that the disparity between the alleged reason for termination and
Frankson's actual sales record, along with DSI's testimony at trial that the commis-
sion dispute was not even discussed prior to a decision to discharge Frankson may
have influenced thejury. Id. at 569. Frankson presented quarterly sales performance
statistics showing that he was first among Major Projects Managers in September
1980. He also presented evidence that had his sales been included in the quarterly
figures for the quarter ending in October 1980, he would have again been first, with
sales of 71,120 square feet. The second place salesperson sold 15,532 square feet.
As of September, 1980, Frankson also showed that he was first in sales for the por-
tion of 1980 through September, and that he had an outstanding sales record when
he was Branch Sales Manager. Id. at 565.
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den of proving loss of employer privilege. 143
V. DISCUSSION
The issues raised by Lewis and Frankson include, first, whether the
ruling on publication in these cases amounts to the recognition of a
"tort of wrongful discharge in disguise." Second, they raise the issue
of an employee's interest in reputation and if the courts should seek
to protect. The final issue is the concern that these decisions will
increase the frequency of defamation claims.
A. Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Disguise
The dissent at the appellate court level in Lewis makes the charge
that the adoption of the doctrine of self-publication amounts to a
recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge in disguise.144 The al-
legation is renewed by one of the dissenters at the court of appeals in
Frankson with regard to intra-corporate publication. 145 Similarly, the
defendant in Lewis argued that recognition of the doctrine of self-
publication amounts to creating tort liability for wrongful discharge
which, at the time Lewis was argued, had been rejected146 by the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.' 47
1. Wrongful Discharge and Defamation
The defendant in Lewis argued to the court of appeals that an em-
ployment defamation claim must be decided without consideration
143. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 145.
144. Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884. The court wrote as follows:
The majority opinion, recognizing that it is making new law in Minne-
sota, adopts the doctrine of self-publication in defamation actions against
former employers. This doctrine, as adopted here, would greatly increase
employer liability, fundamentally ignoring the principle of mitigation of
damages and recognizing, in thin disguise, the tort of wrongful termination
rejected by our supreme court in Wild v. Rarig. (citation omitted).
Id. (Forsberg, J., dissenting).
145. See Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 573. The dissent, in Frankson, notes that the
majority decision makes a drastic extension of the law of defamation in Minnesota;
extending even further the court's decision in Lewis, itself an extension of existing
law. Id. The dissent, in Frankson, continues as follows:
While Lewis involved the self-publication of a defamatory statement to po-
tential employers, our case is considerably narrower. Here, there is no
claim of publication to any person outside the corporation. The argument
presented by the dissent in Lewis applies with even greater force here: "The
majority ruling recognizes, in thin disguise, the tort of wrongful termination
rejected by our supreme court."
Frankson, 380 N.W.2d at 573 (Wozniak, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
146. Minnesota has since adopted a tort action for wrongful discharge based upon
public policy. See supra note 53.
147. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 887.
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of whether the plaintiffs' discharge was wrongful.148 The court dis-
agreed, stating that the cause for discharge is properly an issue both
in breach of employment contract and in defamation.149 The dual
function served by the issue of cause is fundamental to the allegation
that employment defamation is but a tort of wrongful discharge in
disguise. To reach a defamation claim, like wrongful discharge, the
court must examine the basis for the discharge. The cause for termi-
nation is an element both in employment defamation as well as in an
action for wrongful termination. In each case, the employee is al-
lowed a hearing on the justification for the discharge. The key differ-
ence between the two lies within the underlying purpose for
examination of cause. In defamation, the primary purpose is to de-
cide the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement; while in wrong-
ful discharge, examination of cause may be relevant to a breach of an
employment contract or to a violation of some public policy. As a
practical matter, however, the analysis of cause in each case is simi-
lar. Lewis is an illustration of this fact.
In Lewis, the plaintiffs intentionally and repeatedly refused to obey
numerous company requests to submit revised travel expense re-
ports that complied with established company policies. From the
employer's standpoint, such conduct might appropriately be catego-
rized as "gross insubordination."150 One of the oldest recognized
duties in the employment relationship is the employee's obligation
to render obedient, respectful service to the employer.151 The em-
ployment contract implies that the employee will obey all "reason-
148. See Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 881.
149. Id. The court of appeals in Lewis rejected the defendant's argument that the
basis for dismissal could not be considered in a defamation action. The court wrote
as follows:
Because the supreme court has not recognized a cause of action for
wrongful, bad faith termination of an employment contract, appellant con-
tends a defamation claim must be decided without considering whether the
dismissal was wrongful. The logic of this argument is illusory. Cause for
discharge is examined here due to evidence of malicious false statements,
not just bad faith. Similarly, with or without bad faith, cause for discharge
might be reviewed in an action for breach of a relevant contract.
Id. (citation omitted).
150. Justice Kelly, in his dissent in Lewis seems to imply that there is a sense in
which the conduct of the employees in Lewis could be appropriately categorized as
"gross insubordination." See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 895. (Kelly,J., dissenting). Justice
Kelly writes as follows:
Notwithstanding the crudeness with which the supervisory employees han-
dled the situation, still the fact remains that, over the course of three
months, respondents intentionally, adamantly, and repeatedly refused to
obey numerous company policies for such accounts. Thus, from the stand-
point of the company supervisor, that conduct is appropriately categorized
as "gross insubordination."
Id.
151. Obedience to the employer's orders has been described as the employee's
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able" rules and orders. Insubordinationls2 will justify immediate
discharge. This was the action taken in Lewis.
The primary issue in many cases, whether the claim is breach of
contract' 53 or defamation,154 however, is whether the rule or order
is "reasonable." In an action for defamation, the jury will be allowed
to decide the issue of truth or falsity of the defamatory statement in a
context similar to an action for wrongful discharge. The jury will
decide the issue on the basis of both the reasonableness of the em-
ployee's actions and the justification for the discharge itself.
The jury in Lewis decided that the explanation for the discharge
given by the employer was false.155 Similar to an action in wrongful
discharge, the jury was asked to decide whether it was "reasonable"
for the plaintiffs to disobey their employer.156 If the employees were
reasonable in their disobedience, they were not guilty of gross insub-
ordination. The jury's decision led to the conclusion that the em-
ployer's subsequent explanation for the discharge was false and
defamatory. The wrongful basis for discharge, while in itself was not
actionable in the context of at-will employment, resulted in liability
"principle" duty. Von Heyne v. Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 81, 93 N.W. 901, 903
(1903).
152. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 8 v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 478, 480, 433 P.2d
28, 30 (1967) (insubordination as "lack of cooperation"); Muldrow v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 189 So.2d 414, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (insubordination as "gen-
erally disaffected attitude toward authority"); Shockley v. Board of Educ., 149 A.2d
331, 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959) (insubordination as "defiant attitude," "rebellious,"
"mutinous"); McIntosh v. Abbot, 231 Mass. 180, 183, 120 N.E. 383, 384 (1918) (in-
subordination is defined as a "willful disregard of express or implied directions and
refusal to obey reasonable orders"). See also Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 893 (insubordina-
tion defined as "flagrant unwillingness to submit to authority").
153. See Stevens, The Legality of Discharging Employees For Insubordination, 18 Am. Bus.
L. J. 371 (1980). The issue of "reasonableness" in a breach of contract action is
central to wrongful discharge actions involving insubordination. The employer's
right to discharge in such cases is not absolute. See, e.g. Resilient Floor & Decorative
Covering Workers v. Wilco Mfg. Co., 552 F.2d 1029, 1033 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976), where
the court wrote: "in every civilized employer-employee relationship there is an im-
plicit recognition that not every act of insubordination ... justifies an employer in
firing the employee in question." Id. The issue of "reasonableness" is a fact question
for the jury, but where there is no dispute as to the facts, and no question of provoca-
tion or condemnation, it is for the court to decide as a matter of law whether the
discharge is justified. See Helsby v. St. Paul Hosp. and Casualty Co., 195 F. Supp.
385, 393 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 304 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1962).
154. See infra note 156.
155. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889.
156. In Lewis the jury received the following instructions:
In determining the truth or falsity of the phrase "gross insubordina-
tion," you may consider that an employee has a duty to comply with all rea-
sonable orders of her employer, however, she is not required to comply with
an unreasonable order or her employer.
Appellant's Brief at 21, Lewis, 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (C84-1065)
(Trial Transcript at 1030;A. 44)
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for defamation when the employees were given false reasons for
their discharge.
On appeal, Equitable argued that the issue of truth should focus
on the verbal accuracy of the alleged defamatory statement, rather
than the underlying implications of the statement.157 As such, the
issue would be whether it was true the plaintiffs were discharged for
gross insubordination as stated by their employer, not whether the
reasons for the discharge were, in fact, true. Disagreeing, the
supreme court affirmed the jury finding, stating that the appropriate
issue was the underlying question of whether the plaintiffs had in-
deed engaged in the alleged misconduct of gross insubordination.158
The ruling confirms a conclusion that cause for discharge is a proper
element in employment defamation, as well as in breach of contract.
In addition to a ruling on cause for discharge as a proper element
within the issue of truth, the defamation claim will provide an oppor-
tunity to address the issue of malice as it is associated with the dis-
charge itself. The motive for a defendant's conduct is relevant in a
tort, but not a contract context. In a breach of contract action, the
motive for breach is irrelevant to a recovery. Similarly, in the at-will
employment context, the employer may discharge an employee for
any reason not otherwise illegal. Bad faith is not a proper issue in
either case. In a defamation context, however, malice can be ad-
dressed. As the court of appeals stated, "[c]ause for discharge is ex-
amined here due to evidence of malicious false statements, not just
bad faith."159
Not only will the defamation claim allow for a ruling on the cause
for discharge, but it will also consider the issue of malice associated
with the discharge. A tort action for wrongful discharge will do no
more.
The allegation that the rulings in Lewis and Frankson amount to a
157. Lewis, 359 N.W.2d at 888-89.
158. Id. at 889.
159. Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 881. See also supra notes 148-49. In the wrongful dis-
charge context, it is often discharge for non-economic motives, such as spite and ill
will that terminated employees challenge. Most employment relationships contem-
plate termination for performance related reasons only. If a discharge is motivated
by performance reasons, it will coincide with the good faith intentions of the parties.
Termination is often motivated, however, by specific malicious intent to injure the
employee. It is often this element of bad-faith conduct which employees and sympa-
thetic courts seek to address in the wrongful discharge context. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 44, at 290, n.25 and accompanying text. See also, Pstragowski, 553 F.2d at 2-3;
Blades, supra note 5, at 1407-09. In many jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, where
wrongful discharge can be addressed only within an action for breach of contract, the
element of bad faith or malice associated with discharge cannot be examined. See
Wild, 302 Minn. at 439-42, 234 N.W. at 789-90. The defamation action is not so
restricted, but will provide the discharged employee a mechanism for redress of mali-
ciously motivated injury which is not otherwise available.
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creation of tort liability for wrongful discharge is also related to the
historical distinction between tort and contract. 160 The distinction is
significant in regard to a number of issues, including the nature of
the duties imposed and damages.
2. Tort and Contract Duties
The dichotomy between contract and tort regarding punitive dam-
ages is in part related to the nature of the duties themselves. Tort
liability is derived from the breach of a duty imposed by society as a
whole, while contract liability is derived from the contract agreement
160. Similar issues also derived from the distinction between contract and tort
have been considered in other common law countries. It was not possible until re-
cently to join a defamation claim with a breach of employment contract claim in a
Canadian lawsuit. The rationale for the prohibition is similar to that argued by the
dissents in Lewis and Frankson, resting upon the distinction between contract and tort
and focusing on the issue of damages. See Addis v. Gramaphone Co. Ltd., A.C. 488
(1909). The court, in Addis, refused to allow recovery for loss of reputation due to
breach of employment contract. The court wrote, for example:
If there be a dismissal without notice the employer must pay an indemnity;
but that indemnity cannot include compensation either for the injured feel-
ings of the servant, or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that his
having been dismissed of itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh
employment.
Id. at 491.
The "Addis principle," as it is called in Canada, holds that damage for defamation is
not recoverable in a breach of contract action. See M. Grosman, Wrongful Dismissal:
Damages for Loss of Reputation or Stature, 4 ADVOCATES' QUARTERLY 317 (1983). How-
ever, in recent decades, the rule had given way to changes in Canadian law regarding
at-will employment. See, e.g.,Johnston v. Muskoka Lakes Golf and Country Club Ltd.,
40 O.R.2d 762 (1983), where the court wrote about the nature of the issue regarding
damages and the separation of tort and contract:
What the plaintiff is pleading in the two paragraphs mentioned relates
to a developing theory of law as to what may be included in damages for
breach of contract, including breach of contracts of employment. While the
learned County Court judge has, I think, been referred to the essential au-
thorities which bear on this point, it must be said that the question whether
damages that are often associated with tort actions may become the subject
of compensation by way of damages in breach of contract cases has been, in
the last few years, the subject of considerable debate and flexibility.
Id. at 764.
The court continued as it justified the decision to allow the claim for loss of reputa-
tion to continue to trial:
What we are here confronted with, as I see it, is the fact that, in recent
years, the rigidity of the principle laid down in Addis v. Gramaphone is being,
to use the expression of some of the judges, "eroded". The whole of the
law of damages arising out of breach of contract and out of torts, where the
two may overlap, is in process of being reconsidered and clarified. In my
opinion, this situation applies equally to what may be termed a claim for loss
of reputation arising out of a breach of a contract, including a contract of
employment. How that head of claim may be dealt with by a trial judge will
depend very much, of course, on the evidence led before him.
Id. at 765.
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itself.161 A breach of contract is a violation of a duty owed only to
the parties to the contract. Because a breach of contract only
breaches a private duty owed to those parties, it does not violate so-
cietal standards to the same extent as tortious conduct. Therefore,
the need for admonition is not as great in contract claims as it is in
tort claims. Consequently, the distinction between the nature of the
duties imposed justifies application of punitive damages in tort
claims but not in contract claims.
3. Punitive Damages
Generally, punitive damages are not available in a contract ac-
tion. 162 The rule applies in the employment context as well. Under
a contract theory of wrongful termination, the employee may recover
only compensatory damages, such as lost wages, but never punitive
damages.
There are, however, specific exceptions to the punitive damages
rule. 1 63 One such exception is where the breach of employment con-
tract is accompanied by an independent tort.164 Accordingly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated early on that it would permit tort
recovery in an action for breach of employment contract under cer-
tain special circumstances.165 In Lewis, the court clarified the fact
that defamation can be one of the independent torts which allows for
recovery.166 The court stated in Lewis that it is a misreading of Min-
nesota law to preclude tort liability for wrongful discharge.167 In
Wild v. Rarig,1 68 the court held that the bad-faith termination of an
employment contract is not in itself an independent tort of the kind
that will permit tort recovery.' 69 The court did not hold in Wild,
however, that harm resulting from a bad-faith termination of a con-
tract could never give rise to a tort recovery. It recognized such a
possibility when it stated that a plaintiff is limited to contract dam-
ages "except in exceptional cases where the defendant's breach of
161. See Strausberg, supra note 7, at 280; see also Sullivan, supra note 7, at 218-19
(noting that breach of contract abuses no external societal standards of conduct); W.
PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 92, at 655-56 (discussion of distinction
between tort and contract obligations).
162. See generally supra notes 30, 54-55.
163. See, e.g., supra note 55.
164. See, e.g., supra notes 7-9, 54-55 and accompanying text.
165. See Wild, 302 Minn. at 442, 234 N.W.2d at 790. It should be noted that the
issue as to whether defamation was one of the special circumstances referred to by
the court was not addressed at that time. The court did specify, however, that bad
faith breach of an employment contract was not one of those independent torts. Id.
166. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 887-88.
167. Id.
168. 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 (1975).
169. Id. at 442, 234 N.W.2d at 790.
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contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort."' 7 0
After clarifying the issue as to whether defamation has a legitimate
function in the context of a contract action, the Lewis court went on
to minimize the effect of tort damages. The court ruled that punitive
damages would not be available in self-publication cases. 17 1 The
court was concerned that punitive damages may encourage plaintiffs'
republication of employers' defamatory statements as well as dis-
courage communication of reasons for discharge by employers.172
Even with the elimination of punitive damages, however, the dam-
ages issue does not become moot. In a defamation action, recovery
is not limited to specific damages, as it might be under a contract
theory of wrongful discharge. Under the contract theory, a plaintiff
must prove actual damages. Since defamation in the employment
context is defamation per se, proof of specific damages is not required
but, rather, general damages are presumed. This being the case, a
defamation claim, even without punitive damages, will allow residual
recovery above that allowed in the contract context alone. In any
case, proof of damages in the defamation per se context is less bur-
densome than proof of damages for breach of contract. As such, the
issue of damages is still significant, even without the possibility of
punitive damages.
In addition, it should be noted that the preclusion of punitive dam-
ages in the self-publication context does not foreclose the award of
punitive damages in other cases.' 73 Punitive damages are still avail-
able under normal circumstances, including those similar to that
found in Frankson, where publication is intra-corporate.
B. Damages for Loss of Reputation or Stature
The unique aspect of Lewis and Frankson is the fact that recovery
170. Id. at 440, 234 N.W.2d at 789. See also Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 887.
171. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 892.
172. Id.
173. In adopting a tort-based cause of action for wrongful discharge in Phipps, 396
N.W.2d at 592, the court recognized the distinction between contract and tort, both
in terms of analysis and damages. The court also noted the Minnesota Supreme
Court's discussion of punitive damages in Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 891-92, with the pos-
sible implication that punitive damages may be withheld in other newly recognized
actions as well. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 593 n.4. However, the supreme court's ration-
ale for its ruling in Lewis, will not justify a conclusion that punitive damages should be
unavailable in all new tort-based actions. Punitive damages have a useful and neces-
sary function under appropriate circumstances. Historically, part of the rationale be-
hind the punitive damages rule in contract law has to do with the idea that the
efficient allocation of resources requires the breach of unwise contracts. However,
society's economic interest in promoting freely escapable contracts must be tem-
pered by a competing societal interest in discouraging conduct which amounts to
willful and malicious disregard for the rights of others. See generally Mallor, supra note
7; Strausberg, supra note 7.
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was for the loss of reputation flowing from the discharge itself. It is
submitted here that such a claim is appropriate.174 Prominent com-
mentators note that tort law has always been very protective of the
reputation of tradespersons.175 There is a basis for the protection of
reputation in contract as well as in tort law. Associated with every
contract of employment is the implied assumption that the employee
will be allowed the opportunity to enhance or at least maintain her
reputation in that field of endeavor. Since the opportunity to en-
hance one's reputation is an integral part of every employment con-
tract, a loss of reputation upon termination is within the
contemplation of the parties and should be compensable. A person
who enters into an employment contract is not only seeking mone-
tary reward but also an opportunity to advance her reputation in the
chosen field. The "reputation" factor is an implied term of many
employment contracts. Therefore, the opportunity to enhance one's
reputation or maintain it at a level which already exists in any given
area of endeavor is an integral part of the employment agreement.
This may also be true in the case of at-will employment. Upon the
occasion of a "wrongful" termination, loss of reputation due to the
termination itself should be actionable.
C. Frequency of Defamation Claims
Following Lewis and Frankson, every wrongful discharge action in
Minnesota may also include a tort claim for defamation. The re-
quirements of most employee applications are such that any false
reason given for discharge is likely to be republished, either by the
employee on the occasion of application for a new job, or intra-cor-
porately by the employer. Standard application procedures, includ-
ing application forms and employment interviewers, uniformly
require that the employee reveal information concerning their past
employment. Such required information invariably includes reasons
for termination of past employment. As such, in nearly all cases of
employee discharge, there is a compulsion to republish which is fore-
seeable to the employer.1 76 Since statements which affect an em-
174. See M. Grosman, supra note 160. The author of this paper suggests that the
employee has a property right in reputation and that any termination may justify a
recoverable loss.
175. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 112, at 790.
176. Addressing the issue as to the likelihood that defamatory reasons for dis-
charge will be repeated during subsequent employment application, Judge Forsberg
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals writes as follows:
Standard employment application forms, as well as nearly all employ-
ment interviewers, uniformly require information on past employment, al-
most always including reasons for termination of past employment. All
employers can be held accountable for knowledge of this practice. There-
fore, there is in virtually all cases of employee discharge a strong compul-
sion to republish, foreseeable to the employer. Since any statement
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ployee in his business or profession are defamatory per se, 1 77 and all
terminations for employee misconduct or incompetence have this
potential, it follows that terminations may result in a defamation ac-
tion. Consequently, after Lewis and Frankson, every wrongful dis-
charge action in Minnesota178 may also include a claim for
defamation.
CONCLUSION
Employer defamation strikes at the central proposition of the at-
will doctrine, which is the right to terminate at any time and for any
reason. Minnesota's recent decisions on defamation sharply qualify
the traditional rule that termination may be made at any time and for
any reason. After Lewis and Frankson, termination may be made at
any time and for any reason, but the reason for termination must be
true. These cases result in increased potential liability for employ-
ers. In addition, they have significant implications for future litiga-
tion because the alleged wrongful basis of any discharge will, at the
same time, be grounds for employer liability in defamation.
Verdell F. Borth
adversely affecting an employee in his business or profession is defamatory
per se, and all terminations for employee conduct or performance have this
potential, all such terminations may give rise to a defamation action.
Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884 (Forsberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Kelly of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
In claims brought by ex-employees against employers for defamation when
the employment was terminated for "incompetence," "dishonesty," "insub-
ordination" or for any other reason carrying a connotation of immorality,
ineptness, or improbity, "compulsion" will almost automatically be found in
connection with future job applications by the discharged employee. Such
"compulsion" would, with certainty, be foreseeable by the ex-employer.
Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 896 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
177. See e.g., supra notes 60-63.
178. The reader is reminded that all wrongful discharge actions in Minnesota are
contract-based actions, with the one exception of the newly recognized tort action for
wrongful discharge based upon public policy. See supra notes 53 and 173.
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